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A.       INTRODUCTION 
The core theme of this thesis is unit cohesion. Unit cohesion is 
historically recognized as the single most critical element in an effective combat 
fighting force. The Vietnam conflict provided an illuminating example. The 
significant role of unit cohesion among the Viet Cong was well documented in 
light of the vast superiority of U.S. war fighting technologies and control of the 
air. This thesis highlights two factors affecting unit cohesion, peacekeeping 
missions (OOTW) and U.S. versus U.N. operational control. 
Faced with the reality of individual and unit survival, the soldier is a 
product of his indoctrination, training and camaraderie development. The 
responsibility of his instructors is to hone the soldier into both a single and unit 
fighting entity. Though an individual, each soldier must also become a cohesive 
element. The essence of his education and training is to foster the importance 
and promote the principles that unit cohesion plays in combat effectiveness. 
Factors which erode or subvert unit cohesion must be recognized, 
understood and avoided. This thesis addresses two factors which are 
hypothesized to impede achieving unit cohesion among U.S. combat soldiers. 
The two factors are United Nations operational control and operations other 
than war (OOTW). 
This is an empirical study which investigates three hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that combat soldiers will express reservations about participation 
in non-traditional missions. The second hypothesis is that, as the missions 
grow more and more non-traditional and are placed under United Nations 
operational control, there will be an increase in the percentage of negative 
responses. The third hypothesis is that in all cases there will be a significant 
diversity of opinion among the soldiers. 
B.       DEFINITIONS 
Several terms are used in this document which may be unfamiliar to the 
reader. This section provides a listing and definition of these terms. The terms 
are not redefined in the text. 
1. Non-traditional missions - Term used in the text of this study to 
substitute for both operations other than war and peace operations. 
2. Operations Other Than War (OOTW) - Military activities during 
peace time and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes 
between two organized forces.  [Ref. 1] 
3. Peace operations - An umbrella term that encompasses three types 
of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead 
(preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two 
complimentary, predominately military activities (peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement).  [Ref. 2] 
4. Peace building-The post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic, 
that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in 
order to avoid a relapse into conflict.   [Ref. 3] 
5. Peace enforcement - The application of military force or the threat 
of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to 
compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. 
These resolutions authorizing peace enforcement are to maintain or 
restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 
political settlement.  [Ref. 4] 
6. Peacekeeping - Neutral military or paramilitary operations that are 
undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to 
monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and 
support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement. 
[Ref. 5] 
7. Operational control (PDD-25) - A subset of command given for a 
specific time or mission. It includes the authority to assign tasks to 
U.S. forces already deployed by the President and assign tasks to 
U.S. led units by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational 
control, a foreign U.N. commander cannot change the mission or 
deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the 
President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, 
promote individuals or change the internal organization of units. 
[Ref. 6] 
8. Executive Agreement - Often a substitution for a treaty made by the 
President but not requiring the need for Senate approval. Such 
agreements may bind the government just as in a treaty (U.S. v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324). However, such agreements can reach only 
narrower topics or be entered into pursuant to formal authority 
delegated by the Congress in particular legislation (State of Russia 
v. National City Band ofN.Y., C.C.A.N.Y, 69 F.2d 44, 48).   [Ref. 7] 
9. Treaty - An agreement made between the United States and one or 
more independent nations. Under the U.S. Constitution, Article II, 
Section 2 the President has sole authority to initiate and make 
treaties, which must be approved by the Senate before they become 
binding on citizens of the United States as law. A treaty is not only 
a law but also a contract between two nations and must, if possible, 
be construed so as to give full force and effect to all its parts (United 
States v. Reid, C.CAOr., 73 F.2d 153, 155).   [Ref. 8] 
C.       HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Beginning with the U.S. involvement in the Korean conflict, an ever 
increasing pattern of U.S. involvement in conflicts and missions without a 
declaration of war by the U.S. Congress has emerged. These operations other 
than war have conveniently used the vast array of capabilities inherent to the 
military establishment. Recently, however, they have influenced levels of 
readiness and resources to a point of concern. 
The commitment of forces in operations other than war (OOTW) 
presented an opportunity to investigate the effects of OOTW on the attitudes of 
combat soldiers. Attitude plays a linchpin role in a soldier's commitment to the 
mission. This consideration is different from that of obeying lawful orders. A 
military unit may follow orders without question, but the overall attitude of the 
unit towards the mission and the degree of concerns can be very influential in 
the maintenance of unit cohesion and quality of performance. 
The legitimacy of operations other than war is rooted in the 
constitutional powers of the Executive. Executive legitimacy to initially commit 
troops to conflicts is also supported in Section 5 of the War Powers Resolution 
in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress. Finally, the definition 
and possibly the expansion of Executive powers with respect to multilateral 
peacekeeping operations were expressed by the signing of Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 in May 1994. There are several unresolved issues surrounding 
OOTW. This thesis addresses some of these issues. 
D.       METHODOLOGY 
A literature review revealed that several works had dealt with singular 
peacekeeping operations. Some had recorded data reflecting soldiers' attitudes 
on how they felt about being assigned to the mission and their perceived roles 
in peacekeeping. By 1993, several peacekeeping operations had been 
conducted and the introduction of United Nations command elements over U.S. 
forces witnessed. These circumstances have provided an opportunity to 
conduct a study focusing on soldiers' attitudes toward participating in the 
spectrum of peace operations with the possible inclusion of United Nations 
officers commanding U.S forces. 
This study provides information in the context of unit cohesion and the 
influence of attitudes upon it. A survey was administered to 300 U.S. Marines 
to capture the mood of current attitudes. Three scenarios were presented: 
Scenario One - missions conducted in the U.S. under U.S. command; Scenario 
Two - missions conducted internationally under U.S. command; Scenario Three 
- missions conducted internationally under U.N. command. Since no 
peacekeeping field training exercises had been conducted prior to actual 
operations before September 1994, three questions on the peacekeeping field 
training exercises were included. The results on these three questions were 
used to help determine whether such exercises were acceptable and desired by 
U.S. soldiers. Finally, since U.S. Marines have been the primary participants 
in peacekeeping operations, they were chosen as the most valid respondents 
available. 
E. APPROACH 
The changed environment of the post-cold war era, particularly the draw- 
down of U.S. forces, the expansionary roles of peacekeeping operations and the 
inclusion of United Nations command elements, made it important to 
concentrate on unit cohesion, a subject that is as vitally important to combat 
effectiveness today as it has ever been. Though many factors can influence unit 
cohesion, the approach to this study was to concentrate on two factors that 
have been introduced by changes in U.S. foreign policy emphasis, United 
Nations operational control and operations other than war (OOTW). 
F. CHAPTER DESCRIPTION 
Chapter I provides an introduction, definitions, historical background, 
methodology and approach to this thesis. 
Chapter n provides a presentation of legal provisions that have made 
U.S. involvement in operations other than war possible. 
Chapter III is a general overview of military unit cohesion. 
Chapter IV describes the methodology used in the research. 
Chapter V provides a descriptive guide critical to interpreting the data 
presented in Chapter VI and the tables in Appendix B. 
Chapter VI is the interpretation and analysis of the data gathered by the 
Combat Arms Survey. 
Chapter VE presents the conclusions reached from the research. 
Appendix A contains the Combat Arms Survey. 
Appendix B contains the entire set of data tables in consecutive order. 

H. OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 
A  INTRODUCTION 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are controversial. Though they 
may be legitimate, is it desirable for the United States to adopt a foreign policy 
in which they become a frequent and casual tool of U.S. diplomacy? Certainly, 
the United States as a super power is capable of waging and supporting such 
operations whether in concert with the United Nations or unilaterally. 
This chapter provides a brief introduction on the legal provisions that 
have made U.S. involvement with operations other than war (OOTW) possible 
in the last fifty years. 
B.       U.S. CONSTITUTION AND U.N. CHARTER 
The United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945, created the United 
Nations on October 24, 1945 after the Charter had been ratified by the five 
permanent members of the Security Council - China, France, the USSR, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. [Ref. 9] George L. Sherry, former 
Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs at the United Nations, 
has stated that "the UN Charter is the law of the land". [Ref. 10] What is 
interesting, however, is not which document is the law of the land for the 
United States, but how the U.S. Constitution by its design provisionally 
incorporates the U.N. Charter. The ratification of the U.N. Treaty by the U.S. 
Senate, provided a supreme Law of the Land status to the U.N. Charter through 
Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land.  [Ref. 11] 
C.       TREATIES 
Prior to and after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, treaties have 
been made between the U.S. and other countries. With the ratification of the 
Constitution containing the supremacy clause, those treaties already made were 
as binding and legal as any made at a later date. 
Though treaties may provide added assurances, they can be a source of 
international entanglements. President George Washington, in his farewell 
address, stated the concern and gravity of entering treaties and extending 
alliances with other nations: 
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any 
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at 
liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of 
patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim 
no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is 
always the best policy. I repeat therefore, let those engagements 
be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is 
unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. Taking care 
always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a 
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary 
alliances for extraordinary emergencies.  [Ref. 12] 
As guidance and admonishment to the nation in the years to come, President 
Washington stated: 
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in 
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little 
political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed 
engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let 
us stop.  [Ref. 13] 
To date, no treaty has been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. [Ref. 14] Though circumstances at a particular time may have 
warranted the necessity for a treaty, in the absence of continuing 
circumstances, the binding and obligatory contract remains for future 
generations. From the case of Doe v. Braden of 1853 it was stated: 
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[Tjhe treaty is...a law made by the proper authority, and the 
courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its 
provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United 
States.  [Ref. 15] 
Thus, until a treaty comes under judicial scrutiny and is ruled 
unconstitutional, its provisions remain in effect as does the U.S. government's 
obligation to fulfill them. The Supreme Court has made numerous rulings on 
the binding power of treaties. This contractual relationship between the United 
States and other countries carries certain obligations and responsibilities. 
When U.S. national interests are threatened that include a partner through a 
treaty, the U.S. is obligated to respond. That response may include the 
Executive's authority to use military force. 
D.       EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Executive agreements first appeared nearly one hundred years after the 
ratification of the Constitution. The first of these, and many thereafter, dealt 
with trade policy. [Ref. 16] Executive agreements are of two types, either 
Congressional or Presidential. From 1890 until 1953, one hundred 
Congressional agreements had been enacted.  [Ref. 17] 
The stated purpose of executive agreements has been to provide 
flexibility in negotiating international compacts without the due process or 
formal binding power of treaties.  [Ref. 18] 
The Congress or the President may act separately with respect to forming 
these agreements. However, if the Congress agrees to authorize appropriations 
to support a Presidential agreement, the agreement becomes a Congressional- 
Executive agreement. This action though, does not confer treaty powers upon 
the legislature. But, the 1942 Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Pink, gave the 
opinion that executive agreements have the same force and effect as treaties. 
[Ref. 19] This particular ruling has generated much debate and concern since 
domestic adherence to provisions of treaties, not executive agreements, occurs 
only with a two-thirds ratification vote by the Senate. [Ref. 20] This opinion 
made clear that if an executive agreement is implemented in situations where 
the President has full power in his own right, that Congressional appropriations 
are not necessary for its implementation. The importance of this opinion of the 
high court is first, that it establishes the legitimacy for the President alone, to 
make legal agreements with other nations or sovereigns. Second, if the 
President feels the implementation of the agreement is threatened by a foreign 
power, the President as Commander-in-Chief may act. 
The President as the primary elected guardian of the United States has 
the flexibility and authority to act decisively and immediately should urgency 
demand it. From impromptu armistice agreements to a guarantee of action to 
foreign leaders, the President has the sole authority and legitimacy to act. This 
act may be on behalf of the nation or as a partner through treaties or Executive 
agreements. 
E.       PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 25 (PDD-25) 
Though PDD-25 is classified, a document providing the key elements of 
PDD-25 was released by the White House in May 1994, under the title, "The 
Clinton Administration's Policy On Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." 
[Ref. 21] This publicly released document addresses the promotion and 
involvement of the United States in operations other than war whether 
unilaterally or multilaterally with the United Nations in terms of military 
intervention. Further, it provides an outline of the terms of operational control 
of United Nations personnel over U.S. forces. PDD-25 represents the legitimate 
aspect of executive prerogative to commit forces in actions spanning the 
spectrum of peace operations. Its legitimacy is derived from: the authority of 
the President's enumerated powers in Article n of the U.S. Constitution, the 
treaty with the United Nations, Chapters VI and VH of the U.N. Charter, Section 
5 of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, obligations formed through alliances 
with NATO, and the Partnership For Peace agreement. 
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F. LEGITIMACY 
The above paragraphs have touched upon some of the legitimate 
provisions allowing the United States to engage in military operations without 
a declaration of war by the Congress. Both the Korean and Vietnam police 
actions were the result of United Nations resolutions passed by the Congress 
and signed by the Presidents involved. [Ref. 22] It may seem that the 
President may use his powers as Commander-in-Chief to engage military 
personnel in OOTW including an invasion of another country as though he 
were a monarch. But such is not the case, for Article I, Section 8 is very 
explicit in reserving the power of appropriations solely to the Congress. [Ref. 
23] This enumerated power of the Congress provides the check and balance 
in the separation of powers between the two branches. The Congress may 
decide to exercise this authority and refuse to authorize appropriations for 
operations decided by the President. 
G. A QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION 
Operations other than war and placing U.S. forces under operational 
control of United Nations personnel are legitimate. But a consideration that 
must not be shunned is one of justification. The United States can provide a 
tremendous amount of resources and personnel to promote democracies, 
engage in humanitarian crusades, build nations, wage drug wars, provide for 
an environment of peace through presence, aid in disaster relief, lead in 
environmental clean-ups, and execute peace enforcement operations. But is the 
United States justified in conducting these operations and subjecting her 
soldiers to United Nations operational command? If the commitment to OOTW 
results in a degradation of the U.S. Armed Forces' readiness, a shortage of 
funding for manning, personnel and training, or a negative attitude on the part 
of the U.S. soldiers who perform these missions, is the commitment justified? 
Critical to the performance and ultimately the combat effectiveness of a 
fighting force is unit cohesion.  There may exist in the U.S. combat force a 
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negative impact on unit cohesion from attitudes toward OOTW and the future 
possibility of U.N. operational control. The survey results in this study reveal, 
for 300 U.S. Marine Corps soldiers, their feelings and attitudes toward OOTW 
and U.N. operational control. 
12 
m. UNIT COHESION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a general overview of military unit cohesion, 
specifically, its definition, its sociological and psychological aspects, and some 
of the factors which influence it. 
Chief of Staff Edward Meyer (1982) defined unit cohesion as: 
[Tjhe bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain 
their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission 
accomplishment, despite combat or mission stress.  [Ref. 24] 
This definition is derived from centuries of observation of the importance 
of cohesion in military units engaged in battle. Military tactics have evolved in 
the face of changing circumstances. The rapid deployment of small force 
contingents for regional conflicts has become increasingly important. But the 
requirement for unit cohesion has remained as great as ever. Large unit 
deployments with standing opposing armies have not occurred since the Korean 
police action. The changes in the size and composition of contingents deployed 
to an enormous variation of terrain and temperatures have been experimental. 
The shift to littoral warfare, low-intensity conflicts, and operations other than 
war that may involve peace enforcement continue to place great demands on 
the military. The need to develop and maintain small unit cohesion however, 
has not changed. 
B. SOCIOLOGICAIVPSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
The sociological and psychological aspects of unit cohesion are centered 
around the physical and mental well-being of the soldier in relation to his peers 
and command. Shils and Janowitz (1948) stated: 
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When the soldier's immediate group, and its supporting 
formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and 
esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a 
sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with 
authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead 
to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was 
minimized. [Ref. 25] 
The physical and mental relationship is inseparable. Each contributes 
to the state of the other. Degradation of physical well-being as a result of 
inadequate water, food, rest and shelter degrades mental well-being, promoting 
fatigue, depression, self-pity, withdrawal and seclusion. On the other hand, if 
the mental needs of social acceptance, esteem, empowerment, bonding and 
purpose are not structured and fostered, the soldier loses the motivation to 
maintain and sustain the physical well-being. The organization is responsible 
for establishing and maintaining the organic or physical needs as well as the 
military-oriented sociological framework which builds and encourages morale 
and unity. In so doing, the organization supports the soldiers who in turn 
support the organization in its purpose. Through indoctrination the 
organization provides the purpose for the soldier and the unit. As Henderson 
states: 
The soldier is constantly reminded of his responsibilities to his 
buddies, to his leaders, to the squad, to the platoon, and ultimately 
to the people and the nation or party through the structure of his 
immediate unit.  [Ref. 26] 
The essence of a unit's function as summarized from Henderson is: 
The unit serves as a basic, tactical, fire-and-maneuver or service 
unit. It functions as a "buddy group" satisfying the basic 
physiological and sociological needs of the individual soldiers. It 
is led by a dominant group, which establishes behavioral norms, 
and incorporates a self-correcting system to maintain the norms 
through reporting, rewards and punishments.  [Ref. 27] 
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In contrast to definitions derived from a long history of battlefield 
experiences, a recent study conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute in 
1993, defined cohesion as "care about each other, feel very close and like one 
another." [Ref. 28] This terminology seems to suggest that soldiers have a 
subjective relationship rather than one borne of respectability and dependability 
through performance and capability. Unfortunately, this recent study lacks 
evidence for this new view of cohesion. A Korean war study by Clark 
addressing this very issue, stated: 
[S]oldiers can and do distinguish between likability and military 
dependability, choosing different colleagues with whom to 
perform a risky mission and to go on leave.  [Ref. 29] 
Hence, a soldier can have great admiration and respect for a fellow soldier's 
capability and dependability, but not "like and feel very close" to him or her. 
C.       VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COHESION 
Cohesion is formed both vertically and horizontally. [Ref. 30] The 
vertical represents the cohesion of leaders with their soldiers while the 
horizontal represents the cohesion of the soldier with the peers in his unit. 
The unit leader is the most crucial element in the development of unit 
cohesion. Leaders must foster an environment conducive to unit cohesion and 
define the unit's purpose. Henderson summarizes these functions as: 
transmitting the organization's goals to the small group; leading the unit in 
achieving its goals; maintaining the desired small-group norms by ensuring 
organizational support and detection and correction of deviance; and creating 
or maintaining an ideologically sound soldier through setting example, 
teaching, or indoctrination. [Ref. 31] Leaders, depending on their capabilities, 
can either enhance or degrade unit cohesion. Unit cohesion is not static. Once 
gained, it can easily be lost. One major incident that can affect the cohesion 
of a unit is the loss of its leader by attrition or transfer. Even if the new leader 
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is very capable, the process of face-to-face bonding between the leader and the 
unit is time consuming. In this case, the horizontal cohesion level achieved by 
the unit prior to the departure of the old leader will play a significant role in 
determining the time-to-success rate for the new leader and the unit. 
Horizontal unit cohesion is the bonding of the individual soldiers with 
their peers. Though each soldier is an individual, individuality is deemphasized 
to foster a spirit of unity where concern for the well-being and survival of the 
peers is greater than the concern for the individual. [Ref. 32] This requires an 
intensive resocialization process which replaces the typically individualistic 
civilian mindset with the group mindset. This is necessary and critical for 
military effectiveness. Freedoms as a whole are redefined and regulated. The 
unit takes on an identification all its own and exists, in a sense, as a small 
communal organism within a community. Shils and Janowitz recorded a 
German soldier's statement expressing this relationship: 
The company is the only truly existent community. This 
community allows neither time nor rest for a personal life. It 
forces us into its circle, for life is at stake. Obviously, 
compromises must be made and claims surrendered. Therefore 
the idea of fighting, living, and dying for the fatherland is but a 
relatively distant thought. At least it does not play a great role in 
the practical motivation of the individual.  [Ref. 33] 
The motivation to fight and die for one's comrade above and beyond the 
more abstract thought of country or a great cause has been supported by both 
soldier and social scientist writers. When faced with the realities of battle, it 
is the comrade engaged along side in a mutual effort to survive who is 
important and not some abstract ideology or thoughts of country. Hence the 
programs that create the framework of norms, expectations, regulations, 
rewards, punishments and purpose are designed to create and build upon the 
fabric of the small unit community. 
Though the soldier continues to fight and face death with primary 
motivation derived from the presence of comrades, there are occasions in battle 
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when horizontal cohesion is destroyed as a result of intense battle and comrade 
attrition. At this point the vertical aspect of cohesion in the form of secondary 
allegiance becomes paramount in providing the higher cause and larger unit 
identification necessary to motivate the soldier to continue to fight. Through 
the primary leader, the larger unit identification, its goals, purpose, and ideals, 
must be interwoven with the fabric of the small unit's cohesion building 
process. 
D.       FACTORS INFLUENCING UNIT COHESION 
Some of the factors influencing small unit cohesion include the mood of 
the nation, the perceived competence in the use of military forces by the 
supreme governing authority, the competence of the military leadership 
throughout the chain of command, and the attitudes of the individual soldier. 
These factors vary both in the context and the strength of their influence as 
determined by the nation's state of war or peace. A breach of unity and 
harmony at any of the above points can result in a degradation of unit cohesion 
and overall military effectiveness. Sun Tzu in 400 B.C. summarized this 
interrelationship: 
There are four matters in which concord may be lacking. When 
there is discord within the country the army can not be mobilized. 
When there is discord in the army it can not take the field. When 
there is lack of harmony in the field the army can not take the 
offensive. When there is lack of harmony in battle the army can 
not win a decisive victory.  [Ref. 34] 
A nation's support is critical to the personal commitment its soldiers take 
to a conflict. Unlike other forms of government, the U.S. government is 
established by its Constitution into three separate branches of power. The 
powers to declare the nation at war and to conduct war, are granted exclusively 
to the Congress and the Executive respectively. This separation of powers 
contrasts to the combined powers of a monarch. The Framers perceived the 
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U.S. Congress as a large representative body that could best determine the 
mood of the nation and decide whether it is wise to declare war. But the 
Framers also granted the Executive the latitude to use the Federal troops under 
his command as a tool of diplomacy when he deemed it appropriate. This was 
the case in both Korea and Vietnam. Though both actions committed vast 
forces and resources to a battle, in neither case did the Congress declare war. 
Further, both actions were the result of Congressional resolutions, 
commensurate with the United Nations and its Charter. [Ref. 35] The Korean 
police action caused great consternation among many reservists who felt their 
mobilization violated due process. [Ref. 36] In a study by Camp and Carney, 
the attitude of many American soldiers in Vietnam was expressed in a widely 
disseminated acronym with the initials UUUU - the unwilling, led by the 
unqualified, doing the unnecessary for the ungrateful. [Ref. 37] Especially in 
the Vietnam conflict, an emerging disfavor from the nation led to the war's end. 
The personal commitment of the soldiers over time witnessed a pendulum 
effect. History shows that a military force depends on its nation's support to 
maintain its personal commitment and unit cohesion. 
Another factor is the manner of use or the missions the military are 
ordered to perform. Soldiers have recently been used in operations directed at 
establishing regional peace, promoting security, building democracies and 
rendering humanitarian aid in a number of countries. These are new missions 
for combat soldiers. Yet, up to this point, U.S. soldiers have received little or 
no training in programs to establish their competence in peacekeeping 
operations. That's because there are no such programs. U.S. soldiers are being 
expected to perform as if there is no difference between the capabilities of a 
combat soldier and those of a peacekeeper. 
The term peacekeeping, in its early post World War II form, described 
operations used to rescue civilian nationals: Lebanon in 1958, Dominican 
Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983. [Ref. 38] But in 1982, the meaning began 
to change as a result of the agreements made at Camp David by President 
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Jimmy Carter. Out of these agreements, the U.S. sent troops to the Sinai. [Ref. 
39] In this mission, the leadership considered unit cohesion a paramount 
concern, and later a study conducted by Segal with the troops stationed at the 
Sinai confirmed this: 
While a few soldiers felt that the Sinai Multinational Force and 
Observers (MFO) was worthwhile, the great majority felt either 
that the existence of a treaty between Israel and Egypt made an 
interposed military force unnecessary, or that if Israel and Egypt 
went to war, the presence of the MFO would not make a 
difference. The peacekeeping mission was not meaningful to 
these soldiers.  [Ref. 40] 
Miller and Moskos, in a study on attitudes of soldiers in Operation 
Restore Hope conducted in Somalia, found that the majority of soldiers 
disagreed with the U.S. sending military personnel to Somalia especially when 
the mission changed from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping. [Ref. 41] 
Soldiers' belief in a mission is critical to unit cohesion. [Ref. 42] If soldiers do 
not believe in their mission or in their governing authority's competence to 
make these decisions, unit cohesion suffers. 
Leadership, from the Commander-in-Chief to the small unit officer, is 
another contributing factor in small unit cohesion. The consequences of a 
military administrator-in-charge lacking appropriate military qualifications can 
include displacing the confidence of his officers. [Ref. 43] If the leadership in 
the upper levels of the organization has doubts and ill-defined purpose, so too 
will the leadership at lower levels. In the lower levels of leadership, the amount 
of trust that soldiers place in their leaders depends on three qualities: 
professional capability (technical competence), credibility as a source of 
information, and the amount of care and attention that leaders pay to their 
men. [Ref. 44] Crucial for building trust in these three areas is the time- 
consuming face-to-face daily association of the small unit leaders with their 
men. 
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The formation of a soldier's attitude is complex. His attitude reflects an 
accumulation of factors including childhood, religion, education, culture, race, 
and heritage. The activities designed by military indoctrination and training 
conform the soldier into a cohesive member of the unit. If the individuals in a 
unit have great diversity in their background and values, achieving a high 
degree of unit cohesion can be very difficult. But by its nature, military training 
and indoctrination can niinimize many of these otherwise detracting influences. 
A study by Grinker and Speigel (1945) described the process in these terms: 
Friendships are easily made by those who might never have been 
compatible at home, and are cemented under fire...Such powerful 
forces as antisemitism, anticatholicism or differences between 
Northerners and Southerners are not likely to disturb 
interpersonal relationships in a combat crew...The camaraderie is 
so effective that even the arbitrary distinctions imposed by the 
military caste system, probably one of the most rigid social 
devices in the world, are noticeably weakened.  [Ref. 45] 
It is paramount to understand the factors which influence unit cohesion. 
This understanding will aid efforts to predict the effects on unit cohesion when 
changes in missions, roles, doctrine and training are instituted. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A-  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to construction of the survey instrument, a focus group session was 
conducted on April 8, 1994, with a group of eight noncommissioned officers 
from various units at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Training Center, 
Twenty-Nine Palms, California. This audio-taped session provided useful 
background information on attitudes regarding both non-traditional missions 
and non-U.S. operational command and control. It was also very helpful in 
constructing the survey instrument. The following questions were presented 
to the focus group during the session: 
1. What are your feelings regarding use of US combat and combat 
support personnel in noncombat and/or non-traditional missions in 
the US? 
2. What are your feelings regarding use of US combat and combat 
support personnel conducting noncombat and/or non-traditional 
missions internationally under US command and control? 
3. What are your feelings regarding use of US combat and combat 
support personnel conducting noncombat, non-traditional, and/or 
combat missions internationally under international command and 
control? 
4. Do you feel any of the following factors would be affected by units 
conducting non-traditional missions under United Nations 
operational control? 
a. Morale 
b. Unit cohesion/integrity 
c. War fighting skills 
d. Loyalty to command structure 
e. Oath of Office 
f. Loyalty to country 
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In addition to the focus group interviews, three additional audio-taped 
interviews were conducted. One was via phone with Dr. Elliot Abrams of the 
Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. Another was in person with Admiral James 
Stockdale, US N (RET), of the Hoover Institute, at Stanford University, Palo Alto, 
California. The final interview was with Superior Court Judge Robert M. Foley 
at the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Santa Clara,  California. 
The questions presented to Judge Robert Foley revolved around U.S. 
Constitutional law, Supreme Court rulings, definition of legal terms, separation 
of powers, Commander-in-Chief prerogatives, and the "standing to sue" 
doctrine. This particular interview proved to be critical to this research by 
helping the researcher gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
the Executive powers, the Armed Forces to include the militia, and United 
States law. 
B.       PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION 
The purpose of the survey was to gather data on the attitude of combat- 
trained soldiers towards participating in non-traditional missions while under 
United States or United Nations operational command and control. 
The target population was chosen for the following reasons: 
1. The Marine Corps has traditionally been the first combat- trained 
unit deployed to conduct missions associated with national security 
interests. 
2. The Marine Corps has most recently been deployed to foreign 
countries in situations involving non-traditional missions. 
3. The opinions of combat-trained soldiers who are subject to 
deployment and bear the burden of such policy decisions are 
considered to possess a higher degree of validity than opinions of 
personnel neither combat-trained nor deployable. 
4. The Marine Corps soldier is universally noted for his devotion to 
duty, honor, and country, as well as strict compliance with orders. 
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The survey instrument was constructed with the help of Dr. Ronald 
Weitzman, Dr. Bill Haga, and Dr. David R. Henderson of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Dr. Weitzman is expert in the 
psychology of survey instrument design and Dr. Haga in focus group interview 
and survey question/response design. Dr. Henderson provided editorial review 
throughout this process. 
The survey instrument (see Appendix A) consists of 46 questions, seven 
of which inquire about demographics. 
Construction design of the survey instrument incorporated three 
scenarios of non-traditional missions and command authority. Scenario One, 
questions 8 through 17, categorized non-traditional missions conducted within 
United States territories under command and control of United States military 
personnel. Scenario Two, questions 18 through 23, categorized non-traditional 
missions conducted internationally under United Nations auspices, but under 
command and control of United States military personnel. Scenario Three, 
questions 24 through 30, categorized non-traditional missions conducted 
internationally under United Nations auspices and under United Nations 
command and control authority. Questions 31, 32, and 33, each followed 
Scenarios One, Two, and Three respectively, but in the Field Training Exercise 
(FTX) environment. Questions 34 through 46 related in general to any one of 
the first three scenarios. 
Opinions were order ranked: 1) Strongly disagree; 2) Disagree; 3) Agree; 
4) Strongly agree; 5) No opinion. 
The survey questions addressed a participant's fundamental knowledge 
of the United Nations, the United States Constitution, the War Powers 
Resolution, the Posse Comitatus Act, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the 
soldier's Oath of Office, and the Code of Conduct. 
The survey instrument's design provided differentiation of Scenarios One, 
Two, and Three using bold print to clarify the issue for the participant. An 
opinion response directly under each question precluded transfer errors often 
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experienced both by survey participants and data-input technicians when 
separate answer sheets are used. The survey instrument was administered at 
the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Training Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, 
California, on May 10, 1994, by the researcher and an enlisted staff member of 
the Marine Corps Public Affairs Office (PAO). The 300 soldiers taking the 
survey were randomly selected by the Public Affairs Office. The soldiers 
ranged in pay grades E-l through E-7 for the enlisted and O-l through 0-3 for 
the officers. Of the 300 soldiers, 293 were enlisted and seven were officers. 
C.       DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis was performed using the Statistical Analysis System, 
(SAS), software program licensed to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California. 
The 300 surveys, each containing 46 variables, provided 13,800 inputs 
which were entered by hand into a SAS file. Accuracy of input was checked 
by the researcher and cross-checked by Helen Davis, W. R. Church Computer 
Center, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, using techniques 
provided in the SAS software program. 
The SAS program developed accomplished the following: 
1. Cross-tabulation of each question by pay grade. 
2. Conversion to a "yeses" variable the "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" 
responses to Scenario One (questions 8 through 17), Scenario Two 
(questions 18 through 23), Scenario Three (questions 24 through 30), 
and Field Training Exercise Scenarios One, Two, and Three 
(questions 31, 32, and 33). 
3. Conversion to a "missing value" variable (labeled "Frequency 
Missing) all "no opinion" responses for questions listed above in Item 
2 during "yeses" frequency tabulations. 
4. Cross-tabulation of opinions by pay grade using the conversions 
stated in Items Two and Three above. 
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5.   Frequency displays of each opinion category by question into 
horizontal bar graphs. 
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V. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLUECTED 
This chapter provides information critical to understanding and 
interpreting the tables contained in this research document. 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 (page 29) are data output presentations of missions 
representing Scenario One (USUS), Scenario Two (UNUS), and Scenario Three 
(UNUN) respectively. The tables present data in the following manner: 
1. NO OPINION IS MISSING VALUE, denotes a missing value 
assignment to a "No Opinion" response for each question in the three 
scenarios. 
2. Frequency Missing under each scenario, is the tabulation of 
respondents who marked "No Opinion". 
3. USUS, refers to Scenario One, questions 8 through 17. 
4. UNUS, refers to Scenario Two, questions 18 through 23. 
5. UNUN, refers to Scenario Three, questions 24 through 30. 
6. Frequency, is the number of respondents for each row. 
7. Percent, is the percentage of respondents for each row. 
8. Cumulative Frequency, is the progressive sum total of respondents 
for each row. 
9. Cumulative Percent, is the progressive sum percentage of 
respondents for each row. 
10. The numbers in the first column of each scenario represent a range 
of possible "Yes" opinion responses with respect to the entire set of 
questions in each scenario. For this table, via software 
programming, all "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" opinion responses are 
assigned a 'Yes" value. Thus the first column represents the range 
from zero, (no "yeses" marked), to the last number, which represents 
all the questions in the scenario marked "yes". To illustrate, refer to 
Table 1. There are 10 questions in the USUS scenario. The 
Frequency column shows three respondents in the "0" row who 
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marked no "yeses" for any question, and 11 respondents in the "10" 
row who marked a "yes" for every question asked in the scenario. 
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Cumuli itive Cumulative 
USUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 3 1.3 3 1.3 
1 5 2.2 8 3.5 
2 7 3.1 15 6.6 
3 13 5.7 28 12.2 
4 21 9.2 49 21.4 
5 34 14.8 83 36.2 
6 44 19.2 127 55.5 
7 48 21.0 175 76.4 
g 26 11.4 201 87.8 
9 17 7.4 218 95.2 
10 11 4.8 229 100.0 
Frequency Missing = 71 
Table 1. Table of USUS. (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Cumul ative Cumulative 
UNUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 39 15.2 39 15.2 
1 46 17.9 85 33.1 
2 48 18.7 133 51.8 
5 39 15.2 172 66.9 
4 40 15.6 212 82.5 
5 24 9.3 236 91.8 
6 21 8.2 257 100.0 





































Frequency Missing s 33 
Table 3. Table of UNUN.  (NO OPINION is missing value) 
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Tables 4,5, and 6 have the same descriptive labels presented above. The 
scenarios are as follows: 
1. FTXUSUS, is Scenario One under a Field Training Exercise (FTX) 
environment. Survey question 31. 
2. FTXUNUS, is Scenario Two under a Field Training Exercise (FTX) 
environment. Survey question 32. 
3. FTXUNUN, is Scenario Three under a Field Training Exercise (FTX) 
environment.  Survey question 33. 
In the first column for these tables, there are only two possibilities for each 
scenario since only one question was asked. Thus, the "0" row of the first 
column shows that the respondents marked zero "yeses" for their opinions. 
Table 7 (pages 33-36), is a cross-tabulation of USUS by pay grade. The 
columns are divided by pay grades and the rows represent the number of 
"yeses" marked with respect to the entire set of questions in the USUS scenario. 
A description of the cross-tabulation output follows: 
Each cell in the Table 7 output contains four numbers. The top left-hand 
corner of the table identifies each number. Frequency is the cell frequency. 
Percent is the percent of the total observations represented by the cell 
frequency. For example, Table 7 shows that the E-4 pay grade has two 
individuals who completed the USUS question set and marked zero "yeses". 
These two represent 0.87 percent of the total number of individuals in the 
sample population who did not check the "No Opinion" option. Row Pet gives 
the percent of observations in the row that are represented by the cell 
frequency. For example, using the same table, the two E-4's who marked zero 
"yeses" represent 66.67 percent of the total number of individuals who marked 
zero "yeses". Col Pet gives the percent of observations in the column that are 
represented by the cell frequency. For example, the two E-4's who marked 
zero "yeses" represent 4.00 percent of all the E-4's who did not check the "No 
Opinion" option. Around the edges of the table are the Totals for the rows and 
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columns. These give the total frequency for the observations in a given row or 
column. This frequency is also shown as a percentage of the total respondents. 
For example, two E-4's (or 0.87% of the total) and one 0-3 (or 0.44% of the 
total) marked zero "yeses". This represents a row total frequency of 3, which 
is 1.31 percent of the total respondents. Fifty (50) E-4's is the column total 
representing 21.83 percent of the total respondents. Finally, the total number 
of respondents who marked options other than "No Opinion", for Table 7 is 229. 
This leaves the Frequency Missing equal to 71. Hence, the entire sample 
population of 300 is accounted for. 
Tables 8 through 12 are cross-tabulations which present the data in the 
same format as described above for the UNUS, UNUN, FTXUSUS, FTXUNUS, 
and FTXUNUN scenarios respectively. 
Tables 13 through 51 present data in two formats. First is a cross- 
tabulation of pay grade by question. Second is a cross-tabulation as a 
horizontal bar graph. The cross-tabulation format is the same as described 
above. This time, however, Missing Frequency is not included because all fifth 
order-ranked "No Opinion" responses are tabulated and displayed. Tables 13 
through 51 refer to the specific survey questions (refer to the captions). 
The horizontal bar graphs are labeled in the same manner as the 
corresponding cross-tabulations with respect to each survey question. The 
vertical axis of the bar graph represents the order- ranked opinion responses: 
1 - Strongly Disagree; 2 - Disagree; 3 - Agree; 4 - Strongly Agree; 5 - No 
Opinion. The horizontal axis of the bar graph represents a frequency scale 
which varies from graph to graph depending on the highest frequency of an 
opinion-response row. To the immediate right of the bar graph is an output of 
the Freq which represents the frequency of respondents per order-ranked 
opinion. Cum. Freq represents the cumulative frequency of respondents, 
beginning with opinion 1. Percent represents the percent of respondents per 
order-ranked opinion. Cum. Percent represents the cumulative percentage of 
respondents beginning with opinion one. 
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Because many of the tables are two pages, an additional copy of the 
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Table 7. Table of USUS by Paygrade.   (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Continued next page. 
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VI. DATA ANALYSIS/INTERPRETATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Without having first read Chapter V, the statistical information and 
interpretation of this chapter and the tables presented in Appendix B will be 
difficult to interpret. 
The survey provided opinions from a sample of combat-trained U.S. 
officer and enlisted Marine Corps soldiers toward their participation in non- 
traditional missions while under United States or United Nations operational 
control. 
A significant diversity of soldiers' attitudes with respect to missions or 
competence of operational authority can degrade a unit's cohesion and, 
subsequently, its combat effectiveness. The Combat Arms Survey was 
administered to 300 active duty U.S. Marine Corps soldiers at the Marine Corps 
Air Ground Combat Training Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, California, on May 
10,1994. Its intent was to measure the current mood of combat soldiers toward 
their assignments to non-traditional missions and placement under operational 
control of United Nations officers. 
B. PRESENTATION OF SCENARIOS AND QUESTIONS 
Presentation of the analysis progresses through three scenarios which 
vary in areas of operations and operational control. Then it proceeds to Field 
Training Exercise scenarios, and finally to the individual questions relating to 
various operational and control environments. The survey instrument 
presented, with questions 8 through 30, three distinct scenarios containing 
specific non-traditional missions, distinction of geographical theater of 
operations, and identification of the operational control authority. Questions 
31,32, and 33 presented Field Training Exercise (FTX) scenarios and questions 
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34 through 46 presented varying situations relating to non-traditional missions 
and/or control authority. 
C.       TABLES 1, 2, & 3 
Tables 1, 2, & 3 are presented on page 39. These tables represent the 
summarized information of the Marine Corps soldiers' attitudes toward their 
participation in non-traditional missions when under U.S. or U.N. operational 
control. 
In Table 1, of ten United States non-traditional missions under United 
States control, 63.8 percent favored participating in six to ten non-traditional 
missions. These results reveal that a majority of the soldiers favored 
participating in missions under this scenario, while 1.3 percent preferred no 
participation in any mission listed. This response is in light of 23.67 percent 
having no opinion (Frequency Missing). 
In Table 2, of six United Nations missions under United States control 
authority, 33.1 percent favored participating in four to six missions. These 
results also revealed that 15.2 percent preferred no participation in any mission 
listed with 14.34 percent having no opinion. 
In Table 3, of seven United Nations missions under United Nations 
operational control, 11.2 percent favored participating in four to seven missions. 
These results also revealed that 64.0 percent preferred no participation in any 
mission listed with only 11.0 percent having no opinion. 
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Cumuli ative Cumulative 
USUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 3 1.3 3 1.3 
1 5 2.2 8 3.5 
2 7 3.1 15 6.6 
3 13 5.7 28 12.2 
4 21 9.2 49 21.4 
5 34 14.8 83 36.2 
6 44 19.2 127 55.5 
7 48 21.0 175 76.4 
8 26 11.4 201 87.8 
9 17 7.4 218 95.2 
10 11 4.8 229 100.0 
Frequency Missing = 71 
Table 1. Table of USUS. (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Cumul ative Cumulative 
UNUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 39 15.2 39 15.2 
1 46 17.9 85 33.1 
2 48 18.7 133 51.8 
3 39 15.2 172 66.9 
4 40 15.6 212 82.5 
5 24 9.3 236 91.8 
6 21 8.2 257 100.0 





































Frequency Missing = 33 
Table 3. Table of UNUN.  (NO OPINION is missing value) 
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D.       COMPARISON OF TABLES 1, 2, & 3 (USUS, UNUS, AND UNUN) 
A comparison of Tables 1, 2, and 3; Scenarios One, Two, and Three 
respectively, showed notable percentage shifts. In this comparison, two forms 
of percentages are calculated. The first is a percentage point difference 
between table results. The second is the actual percentage shift that the point 
differential represented. 
Scenario One's results are quite striking. That scenario was chosen to 
give the soldiers a situation with the least potential conflict about where the 
missions are performed and about who was in operational control. Under that 
scenario, the missions are performed in the United States under U.S. 
operational control. Yet even here, fully 23.67 percent of the soldiers had no 
opinion (frequency Missing, 71 is 23.67 percent of 300). 
Table 2 (Scenario Two), showed a 30:7 percentage point, or 48 percent 
decrease of soldiers desiring to participate in the aggregate list of missions 
when compared to Scenario One. Two notable percentage shifts occurred with 
the singular change from U.S. territories to U.N. territories while maintaining 
U.S. operational control. First was the 13.9 percentage point, or 1069 percent 
increase in those desiring no participation in any mission listed. Second, was 
the 9.34 percentage point, or 39 percent decrease of soldiers who previously 
had no opinion. 
Recent evidence released in a study on Operation Restore Hope by Miller 
and Moskos suggests that the majority of soldiers surveyed disagreed with the 
decision by the United States to send military forces to Somalia. [Ref. 46] 
Further, the soldiers were evenly split at the 35th percentile between sticking 
to fighting wars and getting more involved in humanitarian missions. The 
Combat Arms Survey results suggest that with the passage of time since that 
operation, the attitude of soldiers in this study are more strongly negative 
toward such missions. 
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Table 3 (Scenario Three), showed a 21.9 percentage point, or 66.0 
percent decrease of soldiers desiring to participate in the aggregate list of 
missions when compared to Scenario Two. Profoundly, though, in Scenario 
Three there was a 48.8 percentage point, or 321 percent increase over Scenario 
Two of soldiers who desired no participation in the aggregate list of missions 
listed under United Nations operational control. This response was further 
accentuated by a 3.33 percentage point, or 23 percent decrease over Scenario 
Two of soldiers who had no opinion. 
The most noteworthy difference in Tables 1, 2, and 3 was the shift in the 
no participation category ("0" row of each column). Notice that as the missions 
shifted further and further away from simply being U.S. missions, the percent 
of soldiers who objected to. all missions grew larger and larger. Whereas only 
1.3 percent of soldiers objected to all non-traditional missions conducted by the 
U.S. under U.S. control, fully 15.2 percent objected to all operations in U.N. 
territories under U.S. control, and a large majority-64.0 percent-objected to 
being involved in any mission in U.N. territory under U.N. control. Striking 
also was the increase in the percent of soldiers who had opinions about their 
participation in these various scenarios--from 76.33 percent to 85.66 percent to 
89.0 percent--as the scenarios progressed to more and more U.N. involvement. 
Could these soldiers be trying to tell us something? 
Starting with what would reasonably seem to be the most favorable 
conditions in terms of operational territory and control, the soldiers responded 
with the largest percentage of no opinions. Then as the environment changed 
and proposed foreign operational territories and control, a very significant 
negative response from the largest recorded percentage of opinioned soldiers 
occurred. These responses suggest that the critical element in the soldiers' 
desire to participate in non-traditional missions is whether the operational 
control is U.S. or U.N. These responses were further substantiated in a 
comparison of Table 39 with Table 40 (pages 43-46). As long as the non- 
traditional missions were conducted under U.S. operational control, the soldiers 
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responded favorably at 72.0 percent. Significantly, the singular change of the 
operational control from that of the U.S. to the U.N. with the same generic 
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Table 39. Table of Paygrade by Q34 (UNM USQ. 
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10 10 3.33 3.35 
61 71 20.33 25.67 
150 201 43.33 67.00 
86 287 28.67 95.67 
13 300 4.35 100.00 
20 40  60  80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
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1 XXXXXXXXXKXXXXXXXX 89 89 29.67 29.67 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 126 215 42.00 71.67 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 54 269 18.00 89.67 
4 XX 9 278 3.00 92.67 
5 xxxx 22 300 7.33 100.00 
20    40    60    80  100  120 
Frequency 
Table 40. Table of Paygrade by Q35 (UNM UNQ. 
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Table 40, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q35 (UNM UNQ. 
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The results in Tables 41, 43, and 48 (pages 48-53), further suggested that 
U.S. soldiers consider United Nations company and/or battalion officer 
operational control as unacceptable. The opinioned responses for U.N. 
operational control ranged from 69.33 percent (Table 48) to 76.67 percent 
(Table 41) against. Wm. Darryl Henderson states: 
Leadership is probably the most important consideration in 
building cohesive units, and it requires extended and intensive 
face-to-face contact between leaders and soldiers. Leaders in 
cohesive units are perceived by the group as professionally 
competent to meet successfully the situation and environment 
faced by the unit; are found at the small-unit level, at squad, 
platoon, and company; are granted sufficient authority to control 
events or actions within the unit in order to meet their 
responsibility for building a cohesive unit; will make use of all 
sources of power and influence with the group, including the 
power to reward, the power to coerce, legitimate power, referent 
power, and expert power.  [Ref. 47] 
The responses of the soldiers in the previous tables suggest that they lack 
the confidence and belief that a United Nations officer could fulfill his role as 
their leader. As soldiers mature in their understanding of what qualities 
constitute a leader, they tend to resist the notion that an officer is a leader by 
virtue of his rank, position or assignment. Yet the definition of operational 
control (PDD-25) presented in Chapter I denies the United Nations officer 
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Freq Freq Percent Percent 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ^ ^ 40.35 40.55 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 109 250 56.55 76.67 
XXXXXXXX 39 269 13.00 89.67 
X 7 276 2.35 92.00 
xxxxx 24 500 8.00 100.00 
20    40    60    80  100  120 
Frequency 
Table 41. Table of Paygrade by Q36 (UNM UN NCO-S & Officers). 
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Table 43. Table of Paygrade by Q38 (UN CO. over US). 
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Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
1 XXXXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 118 118 39.53 39.55 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 101 219 33.67 75.00 
3 xxxxxxxxxx 50 269 16.67 89.67 
4 XX 10 279 3.33 95.00 
5 xxxx 21 300 7.00 100.00 
20     40    60    80  100  120 
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Table 48. Table of Paygrade by Q43 (US Volunteers for UN). 
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Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
1 XXXXKXXXXXKXXXXXXXXX 99 99 33.00 33.00 
2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXKXXXX 109 208 36.33 69.33 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxx 59 267 19.67 89.00 
4 XX 10 277 3.33 92.33 
5 XKXXX 23 300 7.67 100.00 
20 40 60 80 100 
Fraquaney 
Table 48, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q43 (US Volunteers for UN). 
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E.       FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES (TABLES 4,5, & 6) 
The next set of tables (page 55) related to Scenarios One, Two, and 
Three, but were distinguished by a Field Training Exercise (FTX) environment. 
Table 4 showed that 34.1 percent preferred that no United Nations 
soldiers participate with U.S. units under U.S. operational control with 7.0 
percent having no opinion. 
Table 5 showed that 35.2 percent preferred that no U.S. soldiers under 
U.S. operational control participate with United Nations units with 6.33 percent 
having no opinion. 
Table 6 showed that 73.5 percent preferred that no U.S. soldiers 




FTXUSUS   Frequency  Percent F™2-!"f- -!-"--- 
- " 95 34  x 
S 184 65.9 279 100.0 
Frequency Missing = 21 
Table 4. Table of FTXUSUS.  (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Cumulative Cumulative 
FTXUNUS   Frequency  Percent   Frequency f.füffH*- 
- 35 2 99 35 2 
1 182 6«.8 281 100.0 
Frequency Missing  =  19 
Table 5. Table of FTXUNUS.   (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Cumulative    Cumulative 
FTXUNUN       Frequency       Percent       Fpf^*2f* Ü™?"-- 
- 211 73 5 
1 76 26.5 287 100.0 
Frequency Missing =  13 
Table 6. Table of FTXUNUN.  (NO OPINION is missing value) 
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F.       COMPARISON OF TABLES 4, 5, & 6 
These results further support the one factor generating the most 
significant negative response, the introduction of United Nations operational 
control to the mission environment. Between FTX Scenarios One and Two, 
U.S. operational control, there was only a 1.1 percentage point difference. But 
when the operational control switched to the United Nations, fully 73.5 percent 
of the soldiers with an opinion considered the operational control of the United 
Nations as unacceptable. As seen in Tables 1, 2, and 3, the shift to United 
Nations operational control elicited the strongest opinioned response. 
Consider the spectrum of mission dynamics represented in the Bosnia 
and Somalia operations, the new peacekeeping missions in the Bottom-Up 
Review, and the President's Directive on Peacekeeping Operations (Presidential 
Decision Directive 25). A reasonable person might think that a favorable 
acceptance of United Nations soldiers participating in a United States Field 
Training Exercise (FTX) environment would seem both logical and practical. 
In Table 4, however, with 93.0 percent responding, 34.1 percent of the soldiers 
disagreed that U.N. personnel should be present in U.S. exercises. Though 
FTXs are conducted under strict controls promoting safety, they attempt to 
capture realism and upgrade soldiers' familiarity with order of battle, doctrine, 
standard operating procedures, rules of engagement, and unit tactics. Future 
U.S. missions may require the inclusion of international soldiers in U.S. units 
and, in some cases, when national security interests dictate, the President of the 
United States may appoint a competent United Nations officer to exercise 
operational control over U.S. contingents. [Ref. 48] It is noteworthy that no 
peacekeeping field training exercises were conducted prior to any U.S. 
peacekeeping missions conducted before September, 1994. It would seem both 
logical and realistic to conduct such exercises prior to participating in actual 
missions. Such exercises would promote operations familiarity, build unit 
cohesion, and foster effectiveness.  Yet, a significant percentage of soldiers 
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disagreed (Table 4). There are several possible explanations. First, U.N. 
soldiers are not Americans and may breach unit integrity regarding citizenship, 
heritage, culture, and esprit de corps. Second, U.N. soldiers have not taken the 
Oath of Office to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of 
America. Third, U.N. soldiers are unproven in their level of combat fighting 
skills. Fourth, U.N. soldiers, by their presence, may represent the erosion of 
the American fighting man's identity. Fifth, mixing U.N. troops may create 
confusion in communication, execution, and the accomplishment of orders 
associated with small-unit tactics. 
In Table 6, with 95.67 percent responding, 73.5 percent desired not to 
serve with United Nations soldiers under United Nations operational control. 
The opinioned response level and strength of disagreement with this Field 
Training Exercise scenario suggests that American combat soldiers regard as 
unacceptable the involvement of United Nations soldiers within and in control 
of their ranks. 
But peacekeeping exercises are forthcoming. General George A. 
Joulwan, commander in chief of the U.S. European Command, in a prepared 
statement to the House Armed Services Committee, March 23, 1994, stated: 
Peacekeeping field exercises will begin this year. The Combined 
Joint Task Force, a U.S. initiative, is aimed at providing NATO 
and our European allies with a multinational and multiservice 
headquarters that can be tailored to a wide variety of crises. It is 
designed to effectively command, control and conduct operations 
involving NATO and non-NATO forces during peacekeeping or 
other operations and exercises.  [Ref. 49] 
The first of these exercises, Peacekeeper 94, took place in September 
1994, in the Orenburg region of Russia with American (3rd Infantry Division, 
1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment) and Russian (27th Guards Motorized 
Rifle Division) troops side by side performing tasks including force-reaction 
drills, convoy escorts and manning observation posts. Two American and two 
Russian generals were jointly in charge of the exercise. The Americans were 
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Lt. General Richard Keller, General Joulwan's chief of staff, and Maj. General 
Leonard Holder Jr., commander of the 3rd Infantry Division. [Ref. 50] General 
Joulwan stated: 
The European Command's strategy focuses on deterring conflict 
through a strategy of preparedness and active engagement and 
embodies the following long-range vision for the area of 
responsibility: "A community of free, stable and prosperous 
nations acting in concert while respecting the dignity and rights 
of the individual and adhering to the principles of sovereignty and 
international law." [Ref. 51] 
The quote within the quote above is a statement of the reason d'etre of the 
United Nations. The strategy of the European Command's exercises, it seems, 
is to develop force capabilities to help transition to a new world order. 
A soldier's belief in the missions assigned to him is intimately tied up 
with his patriotism or his nation's philosophy of government. There is the 
possibility that American soldiers do not believe in transitioning to a new world 
order. Therefore, they would not believe in or desire to participate in missions 
promoting a new world order transition. Books such as The United Nations: 
Planned Tyranny by V. Orval Watts [Ref. 52] and organizations such as The 
John Birch Society have for years argued that the ruination of the United States 
will result from its involvement in the United Nations and the progression to a 
new world order. President Truman scoffed at this type of advocacy and 
denounced it as "isolationism". [Ref. 53] Dr. Elliot Abrams, Senior Fellow at 
the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., has stated, "...there is no New World 
Order in the sense there are patterns that you can discern and describe in a 
sentence." [Ref. 54] But of what significance and perhaps, coincidence is there 
that the language of key officials in the Executive branch include a new world 
order scheme? 
The Department of Defense created a new office under the Secretary of 
Defense in May, 1993. Sherri Wasserman Goodman was the first appointed 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security. She controls 
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several defense accounts whose multi-billion dollar assets are targeted for 
environmental projects. She stated: 
The Defense Department environmental security program was 
built in response to difficult challenges, including the transition to 
a new world order, a significantly downsized department and 
severe fiscal constraints.  [Ref. 55] 
Not only is the Department of Defense being tasked to participate in 
environmental missions, but apparently these missions will help transition to 
a new world order. Wasserman Goodman's statement that this program was 
built in response to difficult challenges including the transition to a new world 
order, suggests environmental missions will cross international boundaries. In 
Tables 25 and 31 (pages 60-63) 73.91 and 88.63 percent of the soldiers 
respectively, disagreed with participating in such missions internationally. It 
may be difficult to ascertain the reasons why these soldiers feel so strongly 
against these type missions. But the strength of the response does suggest that 
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Table 25. Table of Paygrade by Q20 (UNMUSC Environmental Clean Up). 




















































1 XXKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 99 99 
2 KKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 122 221 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 53 274 
4 XXX 17 291 
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1 |XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 146 146 48.85 48.83 
2 |XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 119 265 39.80 88.63 
3 
1 jxxxx 22 287 7.36 95.99 
4 
1 
1» 5 292 1.67 97.66 
5 
1 
1« 7 299 2.54 100.00 
20    40    60    80 100 120 140 
Fraquaney 
Table 31. Table of Paygrade by Q26 (UNMUNC Environmental Clean Up). 
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Free Freq Percent Percent 
1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXKKXXXXXXXXXX 146 146 48.85 48.85 
2 XXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 119 265 39.80 88.65 
5 xxxx 22 287 7.36 95.99 
4 X 5 292 1.67 97.66 
5 X 7 299 2.54 100.00 
20    40    60    80 100 120 140 
Frequency 
Table 31, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q26 (UNMUNC Environmental Clean Up). 
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G.       SELECTED QUESTIONS 
This section contains the results of some of the singular questions 
presented to the soldiers. There are 39 questions in the survey dealing with 
operations other than war and U.S./U.N. operational control. The analysis of 
all these questions would demand a substantial dialogue. Hence, only some 
queried areas are presented and the reader may reference the appendix to 
access a copy of the survey and the complete set of tables. 
Since 1981, the majority of today's All Volunteer Force has been exposed 
to and participated in an environment of expanding non-traditional missions 
when Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement 
Agencies Act of 1981. [Ref. 56] This act enabled the military to participate in 
the drug war. This cooperative alliance of military and civilian police efforts 
in the name of national security may have eroded the demarcation between 
civilian law enforcement and our military institution first established by the 
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.  [Ref. 57] 
It is not surprising that our U.S. Armed Forces personnel who maintain 
an intimate relationship with American heritage, culture, and civilian 
communities would respond favorably to participating in several non-traditional 
missions in the United States. Their sense of duty, honor, and country 
associated with military service extrapolates to feeling duty bound if they are 
ordered to aid Americans. As an example, in Table 13 (pages 65-66), 97.67 
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Freq    Free.    Percent    Percent 
1 XX 10 10 3.33 3.33 
2 xxxxxx 31 41 10.33 13.67 
3 XXXXXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXXX 122 163 40.67 54.33 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 130 293 43.33 97.67 
5 X 7 300 2.33 100.00 
20    40    60    80 100 120 
Frequency 
Table 13. Table of Paygrade by Q8 (USMUSC Drug Enforcement). 
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Table 13, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q8 (USMUSC Drug Enforcement). 
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Numerous partnerships have developed between military organizations 
and public education establishments. [Ref. 58] Dr. Thomas Sticht, one of the 
world's leading authorities on adult literacy, has advocated making America 
2000: An Education Strategy a reality by using DoD military personnel as 
civilian educators. In his words, military personnel could provide "double-duty 
dollars." [Ref. 59] The results in Table 17 (pages 68-69), however, showed that 
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1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 120 120 40.00 40.00 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 91 211 30.33 70.33 
3 xxxxxxxx 40 251 13.33 83.67 
4 xxxxx 25 276 8.33 92.00 
5 xxxxx 24 300 8.00 100.00 
20  40 60  80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
Table 17. Table of Paygrade by Q12 (USMUSC Substitute Teachers). 
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Table 17, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q12 (USMUSC Substitute Teachers). 
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Department of Defense resources and personnel are becoming more and 
more involved with environmental clean-up. Most recently, U.S. Marines were 
used in California to assist in forest fire fighting [Ref. 60] and relocating cactus 
plants.  [Ref. 61] Vice President Albert Gore has stated: 
As steward of nearly 25 million acres in the [United States], the 
Defense Department faces the daunting task of protecting and 
restoring the land, air and water entrusted to it. Our military must 
defend our country, but not at the expense of the environment. 
DoD is making headway in environmental restoration, but much 
more work must be done. We must strike a balance between what 
is necessary and what is right.  [Ref. 62] 
The results in Table 16 (pages 71-72), with 93.0 percent of the soldiers 
responding, noted that 47.0 percent disagreed with participating in an 































61 61 20.53 20.55 
80 141 26.67 47.00 
105 244 34.55 81.55 
35 279 11.67 95.00 
21 300 7.00 100.00 
10 
■4— 
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70 80  90 100 
Table 16. Table of Paygrade by Qll (USMUSC Environmental Clean Up). 






























































































0             o 
0.00           0.00 
0.00          0.00 















































61 61 20.53 20.33 
80 141 26.67 47.00 
OS 244 34.53 81.33 
35 279 11.67 93.00 
21 300 7.00 100.00 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frequency 
Table 16, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Qll (USMUSC Environmental Clean Up). 
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In May 1992, four thousand U.S. Army and Marine soldiers were ordered 
by President George Bush to augment city and county law enforcement and 
state National Guard during the riot in Los Angeles, California, following the 
Rodney King trial. [Ref. 63] The results in Table 20 (pages 74-75), with a 
notable 97.67 percent response, revealed that 85.33 percent of the soldiers 
would participate in missions under a U.S. National Emergency Police Force 
concept. Furthermore, that 43.0 percent of the soldiers strongly agreed. This 
particular response was a complete surprise. Federal troops have been 
restricted from participation with local police authorities to quell domestic 
violence since the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. [Ref. 64] That 
being the case, it was surprising that these soldiers seemed to not know the 
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1 xxxx 18 18 6.00 6.00 
2 xxxx 19 37 6.55 12.55 
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97.67 
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100.00 
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Fraquaney 
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18 18 6.00 6.00 
19 57 6.55 12.55 
127 164 42.55 54.67 
129 295 45.00 97.67 
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Table 20, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q15 (USMUSC National Emergency Police). 
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For thousands of years military organizations have required their soldiers 
to swear to some form of code or allegiance. A code provides a standard for 
the soldier to live up to and, in many cases, die for. A code can be a powerful 
tool for establishing and sustaining unit cohesion. But what if the missions a 
soldier is assigned to perform counters or confuses the code he has sworn to 
uphold? Question 45 was presented to determine if the soldiers would swear 
to a United Nations code similar to their own. In Table 50 (pages 77-78), 69.33 
percent refused to swear to such a code. No one knows if the American 
personnel traveling in the helicopter shot down over Iraq in April 1994 would 
have sworn allegiance to such a code. Yet, Vice President Albert Gore stated 
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Table 50. Table of Paygrade by Q45 (UN Code of Conduct). 



















0       0 1 
0.00    0.00 i 
0.00    0.00 
0.00   o.oo 1 

































































 * 1- 4 —-H 
10       0       0 
h———— 
0 
0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

























Freq Freq Pareant Parcant 
1 XXXKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 117 117 59.00 59.00 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 91 208 30.55 69.55 
5 xxxxxxxxxx 52 260 17.53 86.67 
4 xxxx 19 279 6.55 95.00 
5 xxxx 21 500 7.00 100.00 
20  40 60  80 100 
Frequency 
Table 50, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q45 (UN Code of Conduct). 
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Though Question 46 was only one question in the survey, the question 
caused national consternation when an unauthorized copy was released by one 
of the survey participants to his elected representative and a news media 
organization. Within three months, the question had generated phone calls and 
letters from Congressional and Senate representatives directed to the 
Department of Defense and the Naval Postgraduate School. [Ref. 66] It 
became a subject of discussion on three syndicated radio talk shows, the 
INTERNET and articles published in syndicated newspapers. [Ref. 67] As this 
thesis goes to print, eight months after the initial public concerns appeared, 
there are articles and discussions still occurring. This is a testimony of the 
sensitivity and concerns of the general public surrounding the issues contained 
in question 46. 
The question was designed to do several things. First, it tested the 
participant's knowledge of the U.S. Constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act of 
1878, lawful versus unlawful orders from a military representative, and the 
participant's Oath of Office. Second, the scenario placed the individual in an 
environment of impending danger. Third, the scenario invoked the possibility 
of deep-seated internal conflict about executing such an order. Fourth, the 
subject matter of the scenario provided a real-time current conflict on the 
minds of many Americans. Finally, the question was intended to determine by 
the measure of diverse opinion, an indication of unit cohesion. 
The results in Table 51 (page 80-81), with 88.0 percent responding, 
revealed that 61.66 percent said they would refuse to fire on U.S. citizens, 
whereas 26.34 percent indicated they would fire. This particular question, 
unlike the others, elicited from 15.97 percent of the respondents with an 
opinion, either heavier pen or pencil marks on their response or written 
comments in the margin space. [Ref. 68] The responses to this scenario 
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Freq    Freq    Parcant    Parcant 
1 ************************* 127 127 42.33 42.33 
2 ************ 58 185 19.35 61.67 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 56 241 18.67 80.33 
4 xxxxx 23 264 7.67 88.00 
5 xxxxxxx 36 500 12.00 100.00 
20    40    60    80  100  120 
Fraquancy 
Table 51. Table of Paygrade by Q46 (US Military Fires on US Citizens). 
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Fre«.    Fraq    Parcant    Parcant 
1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXKKlUIUXltXXK 127 127 42.55 42.55 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxx 58 185 19.55 61.67 
5 xxxxxxxxxxx 56 241 18.67 80.55 
4 xxxxx 25 264 7.67 88.00 
5 xxxxxxx 56 500 12.00 100.00 
20    40    60    80 100 120 
Frequency 




The results of the Combat Arms Survey support the primary hypothesis 
of combat soldiers expressing their reservations regarding participation in non- 
traditional missions. The secondary hypotheses, as the missions became less 
traditional, was supported by the increasing percentages of negative responses. 
As the operational control authority shifted from the United States to the United 
Nations, a significant majority of soldiers indicated that this arrangement was 
completely unacceptable. The last hypothesis was not entirely supported. If 
the reader considers a 20 percent baseline percentage as significant, then there 
was a remaining significant diversity within the ranks in 29 of the 39 scenarios. 
As a caveat, seven of the remaining ten scenarios failed to show significant 
diversity due to the strong skew of opinion towards questions giving the United 
Nations operational control authority. 
Unit cohesion, the human element in combat, is the linchpin to combat 
effectiveness. The recent historical evidence of peacekeeping operations 
turning to combat shows that when the environment changes, principles of war 
apply, and inadequacies of cohesion either within a unit or up the chain of 
command will result in deaths and mission failure. Unit cohesion cannot be 
achieved if the soldiers do not have faith in their leadership, mission or 
purpose. Soldiers will obey. Their duty, honor and devotion to country causes 
them to accept and execute their orders. But in the long term, the spillover 
effects of conducting missions which are not supported by the nation at large, 
or do not generate a strong commitment by the soldier will only erode the 
cohesion of fighting units. Up to this point, these operations have made a 
tremendous impact on operational tempo, resources, and funding for training. 
[Ref. 69] A possible long term effect of peacekeeping missions, if they do not 
have the support of the nation, could well be a negative impact on retention and 
recruiting. 
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Some may argue that the military need only incorporate the necessary 
indoctrination and training to be both proficient and amiable to performing 
these operations. But doing so would require establishing formal training and 
indoctrination programs and acquiring appropriate training facilities, thus, in 
effect, building a completely new program from the ground up. Another 
possibility, may be more realistic. Realizing the conflict and incongruity 
peacekeeping represents in a combat organizational model, it may be necessary 
to bifurcate the military. Such a change could promote specialization and 
provide an opportunity to those who desire peacekeeping duty. Perhaps it is 
time to designate separate fighting forces and peacekeeping forces. 
On September 26, 1994 President William Clinton speaking before the 49th 
session of the U.N. General Assembly stated: 
Our objectives should include ready, efficient and capable U.N. 
peacekeeping forces. And I am happy to report that, as I pledged 
to you last year, and thanks to the support in the United States 
Congress, $1.2 billion is now available from the United States for 
this critical account.  [Ref. 70] 
Perhaps that money could have been used instead to begin a new program 
devoted to specializing our own forces in peacekeeping. But what seems more 
and more certain as time goes on is that the U.S. is realizing the tremendous 
drain of OOTW on the fighting forces. Business can not proceed as usual. 
Many factors influence unit cohesion. This study has dealt principally 
with two of these factors: the missions performed in operations other than war 
and changing the operational control authority from U.S. to U.N. 
Indications are that our engagement thus far in operations other than 
war during downsizing and restructuring has compounded the impact on the 
United States Armed Forces. The United States can not afford to engage in 
peacekeeping at the expense of combat readiness. It is not a question of 
legitimacy, but of realism. The opinions of these soldiers show that the further 
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the military gets from its traditional mission, the more unit cohesion is 
threatened. 
If the results of this survey elicit concerns in the areas queried, then 
further studies are warranted. Perhaps, a random sample survey should be 
conducted to determine whether the results of this survey are valid for the 
entire Marine Corps and/or Army. Also, a survey could provide an indication 
of the volunteer pool that would seek service in units dedicated to, and 
specialized in, peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, the support of our 
current soldiers should not be taken for granted and neither should the subject 
of unit cohesion. 
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APPENDIX A.  COMBAT ARMS SURVEY 
This questionnaire is to gather data concerning the attitudes of combat 
trained personnel with regard to nontraditional missions. All of your responses 
are confidential. Write your answers directly on the questionnaire form. In 
Part n, place an "X" in the space provided for your response. 
Part I. Demographics 
1. What Service are you in? 
2. What is your pay grade? (e.g. E-?, O-?) 
3. What is your MOS code and description? 
4. What is your highest level of education in years? 
5. How   many   months   did   you   serve   in   Operation   Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield? 
6. How many months did you serve in Somalia? 
7. What state  or country did you primarily reside in during 
childhood? 
Part H. Attitudes 
Do you feel that U.S. combat troops should be used within the United 
States for any of the following missions? 
8.        Drug enforcement 
<__) <_> (_J (_> <—> 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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9. Disaster    relief     (e.g.    hurricanes,     floods,    fires, 
earthquakes) 
C_J> <_J       C_) C_J (_) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
10. Security at national events (e.g. Olympic Games, Super Bowl) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
11. Environmental disaster clean-up 
(_) C_J        <_> 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree 
(__) 
No opinion 
12. Substitute teachers in public schools 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
13. Community assistance programs (e.g. landscaping, environmental 
clean-up, road repair, animal control) 
C_J C_J       (._> c_) (—) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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14. Federal and state prison guards 
<_J <__)<_)<__) (_> 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
15. National emergency police force 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
16. Advisors to S.W.A.T units, the FBI, or the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (B.A.T.F.) 
<_J (__) (_) (__) C_J 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
17.Border patrol (e.g. prevention of illegal aliens into U.S. territory.) 
(_) (_) <_> (_> (_J 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
Do you feel that U.S. combat troops under U.S. command should be used 
in other countries for any of the following United Nations missions? 
18.      Drug enforcement 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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19.Disaster relief (e.g. hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
20. Environmental disaster clean-up 
<_) C_J (_J C_) <_) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
21. Peacekeeping 
C_J C_J (_J (_J (—) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
22. Nation building (Reconstruct civil government, develop public 
school system, develop or improve public transportation system, 
etc.) 
(_J <__> <_J (_) <—> 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
23. Humanitarian relief (e.g. food and medical supplies, temporary 
housing, and clothing) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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Do you feel that U.S. combat troops should be used in other countries, 
under command of non-U.S. officers appointed by the United Nations for 
any of the following missions? 
24. Drug enforcement 
<_) ( ) ( ) ( ) C_3 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
25. Disaster relief (e.g. hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes) 
Strongly disagree 
(__) <__) 
Disagree   Agree 
(__) 
Strongly agree No opinion 
26. Environmental disaster clean-up 
<__) (_) <__> (_> (_J 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
27. Peace keeping 
(__) (__>        (_) <_> (_J 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
28. Nation building (Reconstruct civil government, develop public 
school system, develop or improve public transportation system, 
etc.) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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29. Humanitarian relief (e.g. food and medical supplies, temporary 
housing, and clothing) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
30. Police Action (e.g. Korea, Vietnam, but serving under non-U.S. 
officers) 
(_J (_) <_> (—> <_> 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
Consider the following statements: 
31. The U.S. runs a field training exercise. U.N. combat troops should 
be allowed to serve in U.S. combat units during these exercises 
under U.S. command and control. 
(_) (__> <__> C_J "   (_> 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
32. The United Nations runs a field training exercise. U.S. combat 
troops under U.S. command and control should serve in U.N. 
combat units during these exercises. 
<_> <_)(._>(—) (_) 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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33. The United Nations runs a field training exercise. U.S. combat 
troops should serve under U.N. command and control during 
these exercises. 
<_> C_> (_J (_) (—> 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
34. U.S. combat troops should participate in U.N. missions as long as 
the U.S. has full command and control. 
<_) C_J CJ (__) (—) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
35. U.S. combat troops should participate in U.N. missions under 
United Nations command and control. 
<_) (_)<_><_) (—) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
36. U.S. combat troops should be commanded by U.N. officers and 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at battalion and company 
levels while performing U.N. missions. 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
37. It would make no difference to me to have U.N. soldiers as 
members of my team. (e.g. fire team, squad, platoon) 
<__) (_J <_> (_) C_J 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
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38. It would make no difference to me to take orders from a U.N. 
company commander. 
CJ <_J        CJ. C_J (—) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
39. I feel the President of the United States has the authority to pass 
his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief to the U.N. Secretary 
General. 
(_J CJ        CJ CJ <_> 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
40. I feel there is no conflict between my oath of office and serving as 
a U.N. soldier. 
CJ CJ        CJ CJ C_J 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
41. I feel my unit's combat effectiveness would not be affected by 
performing humanitarian missions for the United Nations. 
CJ CJ CJ CJ <—) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
42. I feel a designated unit of U.S. combat soldiers should be 
permanently assigned to the command and control of the United 
Nations. 
CJ <_J        C_J <_) <—> 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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43. I would be willing to volunteer for assignment to a U.S. combat 
unit under a U.N. commander. 
(_) <_) (_) (__) C_) 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
44. I would like U.N. member countries, includingthe U.S., to give the 
U.N. all the soldiers necessary to maintain world peace. 
C_) C_J <_) (__> C_J 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
45. I would swear to the following code: 
"I am a United Nations fighting person. I serve in the forces 
which maintain world peace and every nation's way of life. I am 
prepared to give my life in their defense." 
Strongly disagree       Disagree   Agree        Strongly agree       No opinion 
46. The U.S. government declares a ban on the possession, sale, 
transportation, and transfer of all non-sporting firearms. A thirty 
(30) day amnesty period is permitted for these firearms to be 
turned over to the local authorities. At the end of this period, a 
number of citizen groups refuse to turn over their firearms. 
Consider the following statement: 
I would fire upon U.S. citizens who refuse or resist confiscation of 
firearms banned by the U.S. government. 
(_) CJ <_) (_) (—) 
Strongly disagree        Disagree   Agree Strongly agree       No opinion 
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APPENDIX B.  DATA TABLES 
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Cumulative Cumulative 
USUS Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 




5 2.2 8 3.5 
7 3.1 15 6.6 
13 5.7 28 12.2 







34 14.8 83 36.2 
44 19.2 127 55.5 
48 21.0 175 76.4 
26 11.4 201 87.8 
17 7.4 218 95.2 
11 4.8 229 100.0 
Frequency Missing = 71 
Table 1. Table of USUS. (NC > OPINION is missing value) 
Cumul ative Cumulative 





39 15.2 39 15.2 
46 17.9 85 33.1 
48 18.7 133 51.8 
39 15.2 172 66.9 











Frequency Missing s 43 
,.~\ 
Table 2. 
Cumul ative Cumulative 
UNUN Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
o 171 64.0 171 64.0 
I 29 10.9 200 74.9 
2 18 6.7 218 81.6 
3 19 7.1 237 88.8 




3 1.1 256 95.9 
4 1.5 260 97.4 
7 2.6 267 100.0 
Frequency Missing  -  33 
Table 3.  Table of UNUN.   (NO OPINION is missing value) 
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Cumulative Cumulative 
FTXUSUS   Frequency  Percent   Frequency [?:«".*_ 
Frequency Missing = 21 
Table 4. Table of FTXUSUS. (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Cumulative Cumulative 
FTXUNUS   Frequency  Percent  Frequency ^«2-- 
Table 5. Table of FTXUNUS. (NO OPINION is missing value) 
Cumulative Cumulative 
FTXUNUN  Frequency  Pf^cent frequency P^cent_ 
 Ä       ?77     7 3 5        211      73.5 I m 26.5        287     100.0 
Frequency Missing = 13 
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Percent  1 
Row Pet  1 



















12      17 
5.24    7.42 
27.27   38.64 
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43.75 1  33.33 1 
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Frequency 1 
Percent     i 
Row Pet     1 
0   ! 
n 1 




E7              1 
0   I 
0.00   1 
01 1 
0   1 
0.00   1 
02 
0.00 
103               1 




0.00   1 0.00   1 0.00 33.33   1 
0.00   1 0.00   1 0.00 100.00   I 
5 
2.18 1 0   1               0   1 n  nn   1        0.00 
0   1 
0.00   1 
1 
0.44 0.00   I 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00   i 0.00   1 20.00 0.00   1 
0.00   1 0.00   1 100.00 0.00   I 
7 
3.06 2 1 0  44 
0 
0.00 
0   1 





14  29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 
5.68 3   I 1 
1 
0   44 





1 7   69 |        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 20.00 |        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 h 
21 
9.17 4 1 0   44 
1        1 







4.76 |        4.76 4.76 0.00 0.00 
20.00 |   100.00 20.00 |        0.00 0 .00 ■ 
34 
14.85 5   1 1 
1 
0   44 
1          o 







i I 2.94 |        0.00 1 2.94 0.00 0.00 
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Frequency! 
Percent     1 
Row Pet     1 













6   I 0   1 
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0.00   1 
0   1 
0.00   I 
0.00   1 





0   1 
0.00   1 
0.00   I 
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Frequency 1 
Percent  1 
Row Pet  1 
0 1 
El      IE2     IE3     IE«     J 
0 1      4 1     19 1     1*| 
0.00 1   1.56 1   7.39 1   5.45 
0.00 I  10.26 1  48.72   35.90 
0.00 I   5.41 1  19.59 1  22.95 1 























1 1 1 I     12 
0.39 I   4.67 
2.17 1  26.09 












2 1 2 1     15 1 
0.78 1   5.84 
4.17 1  31.25 
50.00 I  20.27 
15 1     9 
5.84 1   3.50 
31.25 1  18.75 




3 ! 0 |     12      15       9 0.00 1   4.67    5.84    3.50 
Oioo 1  30.77   38.46   23.08 




4 1 1     13 
0.39 1   5.06 
2.50 1  32.50 












5 0 1     11 
0.00 1   4.28 
0.00 1  45.83 





1      7 
I   2.72 
I  29.17 
I  11.48 
[   0.00 
I   0.00 
I   0.00 
6 0 1      7 
0.00 1   2.72 
0.00 1  33.33 |   0.00 1   9.46 
1     6 |   2.33 
I  28.57 |   6.19 
1      4 
I   1.56 |  19.05 |   6.56 
|   0.78 
I   9.52 
I  25.00 
Total 4      74 
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Percent  1 
Row Pet  1 
0 1 
E6     1E7     101 
11     0 1 
0.39 1   0.00 1 
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11     o 
0.39 1   0.00 
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1    o 
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24 
9.34 5 0 0.00 





1    o 
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1     21 
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1    o I 





1    o 
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1.90 I   0.47 
80.00 1 100.00 
0.95     0.47 1   O.t/ 
40.00   100.00 I 100.00 I 










i 1 32 1 0.00 3.95 0.00 1 0.00 i 





1.74 0.35 0.35 0.35 100.00 
Frequency Missing =13 







51  Total 
0 I 0 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 i 0.00 



































































































1      67 





















Free Freq Percent Percent 
1 XX 10 10 3.33 
3.33 
2 |xxxxxx 31 41 10.33 13.67 
3 1xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 122 163 40.67 54.33 
4 |XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 130 293 43.33 97.67 
5 
1 
1« 7 300 2.33 100.00 
20    40    60    80  100 120 
Frequency 
Table 13. Table of Paygrade by Q8 (USMUSC Drug Enforcement). 





















Freq Freq Percent Percent 
10 10 3.33 3.33 1 XX 
31 41 10.33 13.67 2 xxxxxx 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 122 
163 40.67 54.33 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 130 
293 43.33 97.67 
5 X 7 
300 2.33 100.00 
20    40    60    80 100 120 
Frequency 




Row Pet  I 







































































































































































20     40    60     80  100  120 
Frequency 
Table 14. Table of Paygrade by Q9 (USMUSC Disaster Relief). 















03 | n 0 00 0 
—— t— 
1 1 




| o 00 100 00 1 0 .00 1 
1 0 .00 2 04 1 0 .00 
-► 













0 .00 0 .00    o 




































































































































































































1 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 40 40 13.55 13.35 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 89 129 29.67 43.00 
5 ixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 79 208 26.55 69.35 
4 Ixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 82 290 27.55 96.67 
5 
1 
xxxx 10 300 5.35 100.00 
10  20  30  40  50 60 70  80  90 
Frequency 






















1 31 41 
1 1 
0
  1 0.00   i 
0.00 
0.00   1 
1   1 
0.33 
20.00 
1.22   1 
F7 
—— .»-.. -+— 
1             1   1 0 0.53 0.00 
100.00   1 0.00 
1       2.50   I 0.00 











































0                3 
0.00         6D.00 















































































10 20 30     40    50    60 
Fraquaney 
70    80     90 























































































E5 3 1     2 
1.00 1   0.67 
33.33 1  22.22 
4.92 1   2.50 
25 I     9 5 
8.33    3.00 1 1.67 
37.31   13.43 7.46 














































61 61 20.33 20.33 
80 141 26.67 47.00 
103 244 34.33 81.33 
35 279 11.67 93.00 
21 300 7.00 100.00 
10  20  30 60 40  50 
Fraquancy 
70 80 90 100 
Table 16. Table of Paygrade by Qll (USMUSC Environmental Clean Up). 





Col Pet II 31 41 
E6 
--.-■■--..» 
2   1 
0.67 
40.00 
3.28   1 
E7 1 0.33 
100.00 
1.64 
(.     .-- h 
01 0 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
L__»             ——+ 
02 0 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 




















































0 0 0 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 ►———H 
0.00 










































Cum. „ Cu": 
Fraq Fraq Pareant Parcant 




xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx          80 1*1 















"tr^O  30  40  50  60  70 80  90 100 
Fraquancy 
Table 16, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Qll (USMUSC Environmental Clean up;. 
118 
Frequency1 
Percent  1 
Row Pet  1 
Col Pet  1 11 21 31 4J 51 




















































8 1     10 1 
2.67 1   3.33 
7.21 1   9.01 













9        4 | 
3.00     1.33 1 
13.43    5.97 | 















11     o 
0.33 1   0.00 I 
11.11 1   0.00 1 



































+ (. + +—+—+ 







120 120 40.00 40.00 
91 211 30.33 70.33 
40 251 13.33 83.67 
25 276 8.33 92.00 
24 300 8.00 100.00 
Table 17. Table of Paygrade by Q12 (USMUSC Substitute Teachers). 






:ent  1 
Pet  1 





21 3! 41 51 






















































































































1 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 120 120 40.00 40.00 
2 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 91 211 30.33 70.33 
3 
1 
1xxxxxxxx 40 251 13.33 83.67 
4 





20  40  60  80 100 120 
Fraquancy 



































48   I 
16.00   I 
43.24   I 










3   I 
1.00   I 
3.16   I 
23.08   1 
1   I 
0.33   I 
20.00   I 





























































































1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 118 118 
39.33 39.33 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 113 
231 37.67 77.00 
42 273 14.00 91.00 3 xxxxxxxx 
13 286 4.33 95.33 
<♦ XXX 
14 300 4.67 100.00 
5 XXX 
20  40  60  80 100 120 
Frequency 
Table 18. Table of Paygrade by Q13 (USMUSC Commumry Assistance). 




Row Pet I 











































































































































1      1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 118 
118 39.33 39.33 
2 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 113 231 37.67 77.00 
42 273 14.00 91.00 3 xxxxxxxx 
13 286 4.33 95.33 
4 XXX 
14 300 4.67 100.00 
5 XXX 
20     40    60     80  100  120 
Fraquancy 




Row Pet  I 


































i———■■»———.■> ■  —-— 
2       I       0 
0.67 0.67 0.55 0.00 




!■--  '■■-■< 







































































































61 61 20.33 20.53 
92 153 30.67 51.00 
75 228 25.00 76.00 
55 283 18.53 94.33 
17 300 5.67 100.00 
Table 19. Table of Paygrade by Q14 (USMUSC Prison Guards). 























2 ! 0 67 
40 .00 i 













































I 0.33 I 
I 100.00 I 




























0 1     0 1 
0.00 I   0.00 1 
0.00    0.00 































1 ************************ 61 
61 20.33 20.33 
2 ************************************* 92 
153 30.67 51.00 
3 ****************************** 75 
228 25.00 76.00 
4 ********************** 55 
283 18.33 94.33 
5 ******* 17 
300 5.67 100.00 











21 31      4 
0
 ! 2 I     3 0.00 i 0.67 1   1.00 
0.00 40.00 1  60.00 
0.00 i 1.57 1   2.33 
— 



















Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
1 xxxx 18 IS 6.00 6.00 
2 xxxx 19 37 6.35 12.33 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 127 164 42.33 54.67 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 129 293 45.00 97.67 
5 X 7 300 2.35 100.00 
»f ► ►— 
20 40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquancy 
Table 20. Table of Paygrade by Q15 (USMUSC National Emergency Police). 






















1     2 
>-■- ■+— 
1 1 0 1 
0.67 0.33 1 0.00 1 
40.00 20.00 0.00 |   1.57 0.78 1 0.00 1 
-+—————A 
I       1 0 0 
0.33 0.00 j 0.00 
100.00 0.00 1 0.00 
0.79 
^..———H 
0.00 j 0.00 
51    Total 
5 
.67 




02 1   I 0.33   I 
100.00   I 




























0 00 0 .00 1 0 00 
0 .00 0 .00 1 0 00 




























































.+— .+ ► ►— 














Col Pet 31 
—f- 


































 1- ——+ —«H 
8      26 1    25 
2.68 8.70    8.36 J 
11.94 38.81   37.31 1 





































































Table 21. Table of Paygrade by Q16 (USMUSC FBI & BATF Advisors). 














































oi i ! 
0.00 I 0.33 
0.00 I 100.00 
o.oo I £^i_] 
Ö~T 3 ! 
o.oo I l.oo 
0.00 I «0.00 













I     U I'  I 








0 I 0 
0.00 I 0.00 
0.00 I 0.00 
0.00 I o.oo 
0 0
 1 0.00 0.00 i 
0.00 0.00 1 






































3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 132 

























































































































2 4 3 0 
0.67 1.34 1.00 0.00 





























Froq    Froq    P«rc«nt    Porcont 
1 XXX 17 17 5.69 5.69 
2 xxxxxxxxx 43 60 14.38 20.07 
3 XXXXXKKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 113 173 37.79 57.86 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 116 289 38.80 96.66 
5 XX 10 299 3.34 100.00 
20  40 60 80 100 
Froquoncy 
Table 22. Table of Paygrade by Q17 (USMUSC Border Patrol). 

























s « 51 
3       0       0 
1.00    0.00    0.00 
60.00    0.00    0.00 
2.65    0.00    0.00 

















03 1 0.33 
100.00 
5.88 

































0 0 0 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 
1— , .i  --H 


































C«iai. .     _    Cu": 
Fraq Fraq Parcant Parcant 
1 XXX 17 
17 5.69 5.69 
2 xxxxxxxxx 45 
60 14.58 20.07 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 115 175 
57.79 57.86 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 116 289 
38.80 96.66 
5 XX 10 299 
3.34 100.00 
20  40 60  80 100 
Fraquancy 

















































































































3 1 2 1 0 1 
1.00 1 0.67 1 0.00 I 
33.33 1 22.22 1 0.00 I 
3.57 1 


































60 .  60 20.07 20.07 
84 144 28.09 48.16 
84 228 28.09 76.25 
60 288 20.07 96.32 
11 299 3.68 100.00 
____+___—*—™+- -f— 
10   20 30   40   50 
Fraquancy 
60 70  80 
Table 23. Table of Paygrade by Q18 (UNMUSC Drug Enforcement). 





















Freq    Freq    Percent    Percent 
****************************** 
****************************************** 





60 60 20.07 20.07 
84 144 28.09 48.16 
84 228 28.09 76.25 
60 288 20.07 96.32 
11 299 3.68 100.00 
10       20 40 30             50 
Frequency 
60 70      80 
Table 23, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q18 (UNMUSU Drug Enforcement). 
132 
Frequency! 
Percent  I 
Row Pet 











































































































































64 64 21.40 21.40 
107 171 35.79 57.19 
88 259 29.43 86.62 
30 289 10.03 96.66 
10 299 3.54 100.00 
10 20 
•+■ ■+« 
30 40  50  60 70 
Frequency 
80  90 100 
Table 24. Table of Paygrade by Q19 (UNMUSC Disaster Relief). 
Continued next page. 
133 
FrequencyI 
Parennt  I 
Row Pet 
Col Pet  I II 
—4- 
21 31 41 























































































































64 64 21.40 21.40 
107 171 35.79 57.19 
88 259 29.43 86.62 
30 289 10.03 96.66 
10 299 3.34 100.00 
■+• -f" 
10 20 30 40 50 60 
Fraquaney 
70 80  90 100 





Col Pet 51 41 
2 
1— --■ —-»-■■"■ -• 
0 0 
•+ 1 
0 .67 0 .00 0 00 i 
40 .00 0 .00 0 00 1 
3 .77 0 
h—— 
.00           0 
+—— 
00 1 ■+ 







































































0 2 0 
0.00 0.67 0.00 
0.00 22.22 0.00 
0.00 11.76           0.00 




































99 99 55.11 55.11 
122 221 40.80 75.91 
53 274 17.75 91.64 
17 291 5.69 97.52 
8 299 2.68 100.00 
20    40    60    80  100  120 
Frequency 
Table 25. Table of Paygrade by Q20 (UNMUSC Environmental Clean Up). 



























0.00    0.00 





















Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 99 99 
33.11 33.11 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 122 221 
40.80 73.91 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 53 274 
17.73 91.64 
4 XXX 17 291 
5.69 97.32 
8 299 2.68 100.00 5 XX 
20    40    60    80 100 120 
Fraquaney 


















48      27 6 
16.05 9.05 2.01 
51.06 28.72 6.38 
36.36 39.13   54.55 
47 1    23 2 1 
15.72 7.69 0.67 
42.34 20.72 1.80 














E5 0 2 2 4 1 
0.00 0.67 0.67 1.34 0.33 
0.00 22.22 22.22 44.44 11.11 
0.00    3.45    1.52    5.80 

























Fraq Fraq Pareant Parcant 
1 xxxxxx 29 29 9.70 9.70 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxx 58 87 19.40 29.10 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 132 219 44.15 73.24 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 69 288 23.08 96.32 
5 XX 11 299 3.68 100.00 
20  40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
Table 26. Table of Paygrade by Q21 (UNMUSC Peace Keeping). 























































20  40 60  80 1Ö0 120 
Fraquancy 

































I     15.38 7.02 0.67 1.34 
1     48.94 22.34 2.13 4.26 |     31.72 
4—————1 
40.38 









I 24 I 
I 8.03 I 
I 35.82 I 












1                       1    1 0 
0.67 1.67 0.33 0.35 0.00 
22.22 55.56 11.11 11.11   1 0.00 
2.47 3.45 
t—-——-■< 

























































20     40    60 80  100 120  140 
Frequency 
Table 27. Table of Paygrade by Q22 (UNMUSC Nation Building). 


















































0 33 0 00 
20 00 0 .00 


























































1 XXXXXXXXKXXXXXXX 81 81 27.09 
27.09 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 145 226 48.49 
75.59 
3 xxxxxxxxxx 52 278 17.39 
92.98 
4 XX 10 288 3.34 
96.32 
5 XX 11 299 3.68 
100.00 
20     40    60     80  100  120  140 
Fraquaney 




Row Pet  i 










1 2 o I 1 1 
.33 0.67 0.00 0.33 




y.m — mmm-i 
0.00 i ►__ ►- 6.67 1 —-----» 
6   I 
2.01   I 
6.38   I 
18.75   I 














































► —I ►- 
24 1    11 1 2 1 
6.55 8.05    5.68 0.67 1 
28.56 35.82   16.42 1 2.99 1 




E5 0 1 2 5 1 
0.00 1 0.67 1.67 0.35 0. 
0.00 f 22.22 55.56 11.11 11. 
0.00 1 2.11 
_______ 
4.17 































1 xxxxxx 32 52 10.70 10.70 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 95 127 51.77 42.47 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 120 247 40.15 82.61 
4 XXXXXXK 37 284 12.57 94.98 
5 XXX 15 299 5.02 100.00 
■+— 
20    40    60    80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
Table 28. Table of Paygrade by Q23 (UNMUSC Humanitarian Relief). 




Row Pet I 




0.33 0.00 I 
20.00 0.00 1 













0 1 1 
0.00 0.33 
0.00 100.00 











































































xxxxxx 32 32 10.70 10.70 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 95 127 31.77 42.47 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 120 247 40.13 82.61 
xxxxxxx 37 284 12.37 94.98 
XXX 15 299 5.02 100.00 














1       2 
20.00 1  40.00 
0.98 1   5.71 
11     0       5 
0.33    0.00    1.67 
20.00    0.00 
6.25 1   0.00 






























43       8 
14.38    2.68 
38.74    7.21 


















1  25.37 
I  16.67 
5       3 
1.67    1.00 
7.46    4.48 
14.29   18.75 
0      67 









1     2 1     1 
I   0.67    0.33 
22.22   11.11 







































20    40    60    80 100  120  140 
Fraquaney 
141 141 47.16 47.16 
102 243 34.11 81.27 
35 278 11.71 92.98 
16 294 5.35 98.33 
5 299 1.67 100.00 
Table 29. Table of Paygrade by Q24 (UNMUNC Drug Enforcement). 








































—+- 1 1       0 
K——— »-. 
0
 ! 0 1 0.33 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 1 20.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.98 
--»■ -— A 

















































1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 141 141 47.16 47.16 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 102 245 54.11 81.27 
3 xxxxxxx 35 278 11.71 92.98 
4 XXX 16 294 5.55 98.55 
5 X 5 299 1.67 100.00 















0.00 i ►——-—4— 
0











































0 o 1 
1  i-oo 0.33 0.00 0.00 
I  33.33 11.11 0.00 0.00 i 
1   2.52 i 































1 |»XXX********************** 132 132 44.15 44.15 
2 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 119 251 39.80 83.95 
3 
1 jxxxxxxx 34 285 11.37 95.32 
4 
1 6 291 2.01 97.32 
5 
1 j XX 8 299 2.68 100.00 
20  40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
Table 30. Table of Paygrade by Q25 (UNMUNC Disaster Relief). 
















1.34  I 
80.00 
3.36 
I     


























0.00   i 














3  I 






0.76   I 
1   ! 0.33 
100.00 






















0.00   . 



















0   I 
0.00 
0.00 































1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 132 152 44.15 44.15 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 119 251 39.80 
85.95 
3 xxxxxxx 34 285 11.37 
95.32 
4 X 6 291 2.01 97.32 
5 XX 8 299 2.68 
100.00 
20 40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquaney 


























4   I 
1.34 
80.00 


























































17   K           5 o ! 1 5.69   1       1.67   1 0.00 0.33 
25.37           7.46   1 0.00 1.49 

















































l__   _      h  

























Table 31. Table of Paygrade by Q26 (UNMUNC Environmental Clean Up). 
Continued next page. 
147 
FrequencyI 
Pareant  I 
Row Pet 







I 1.3« | 80.00 
I 3.36 
«I 51  Total 
1 0 0   1 0   1 
1 0.00 0.00   1 0.00   1 
1 0.00 0.00   1 0.00   | 
1 0.00           0.00   I 0.00   I 








































02                1              1 0 
1        0.33 0.00 
I   100.00   i 0.00 
I       0.68   1 














































































0   1 
0.00   I 
0.00   1 
0.00   1 
—— ►— 
0   1 
0.00 
0.00 














































































9.70 j     30.85 

















































































3   I 

































1 |*********************** 116 116 38.80 38.80 
2 |******************* 93 209 31.10 69.90 
3 j xxxxxxxxxxxxx 67 276 22.41 92.31 
4 |xx 12 288 4.01 96.32 
5 |XX 11 299 3.68 100.00 
20 40  60 80 100 
Fraquaney 
Table 32. Table of Paygrade by Q27 (UNMUNC Peace Keeping). 
Continued next page. 
149 
FrequencyI 
Percent     I 
Row Pet 




1 1 4 
0.33 1 1.34 
20.00 80.00 













1.00   I 
60.00 

































100.00   . 
















































































1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 116 116 38.80 
38.80 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 93 209 31.10 
69.90 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxx 67 276 22.41 
92.31 
4 XX 12 288 4.01 
96.32 
5 XX 11 299 3.68 
100.00 



































 ! 11.71 15.38 2.68 0.33 1.34 i 
37.23 48.94 8.51 1.06 4.26 1 
25.36 38.33 1  30.77   16.67 
_J ■ 1 44.44 | 
F1 46      51 9 2 3 
15.38 17.06 3.01 0.67 1.00 
41.44 45.95 8.11 1.80 2.70 
33.33   42.50 34.62   33.33 
1 L. 1 
33.33 
F4 44 13 7 2 1 1 
14.72 4.35 2.34 0.67 0.33 
65.67 19.40 10.45 2.99 1.49 
31.88 10.83 26.92   33.33 11.11 1 
E5 5 3 0 1 0 
1.67 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 
55.56 33.33 0.00 11.11 0.00 
_____ 
3.62 ►___ ~H 2.50 ►__—.—H 
0.00 I 
!•_____ _H 











































138 138 46.15 46.15 
120 258 40.13 86.29 
26 284 8.70 94.98 
6 290 2.01 96.99 
9 299 3.01 100.00 
20    40    60    80 100  120  140 
Fraquaney 
Table 33. Table of Paygrade by Q28 (UNMUNC Nation Building). 












0   I 5 
0.00   I       1.67 













1 Ixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 138 138 46.15 46.15 
2 Ixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 120 258 40.13 86.29 
3 
1 1xxxxx 26 284 8.70 94.98 
4 
1 
IX 6 290 2.01 96.99 
5 
1 jxx 9 299 3.01 100.00 
20 40 60  80 100 120 140 
Fraquaney 




Row Pet I 
Col Pet  I II 21 
El                1 11             1 
1 0.33   1       0.33 
1 20.Off         20.00   1 
1 0.87   I       0.95   1 
E2               1 25   1            37 
8.36         12.37 j 26.60         39.36 
 ' 
21.74   I     34.58 
31 

























I 41 I 
I 13.71 I 
I 36.94 | 

















(    36 
I 12.04 
I 53.73 I 



























E5 1              5 
1       1.67 
1     55.56 
1       4.55 






___ 1 _+ ______+ 
0                  11 
0.00           0.53           0.53 
0.00         11.11         11.11 
0.00         14.29           7.69 



































115 115 38.46 38.46 
107 222 35.79 74.25 
57 279 19.06 93.31 
7 286 2.54 95.65 
13 299 4.55 100.00 
20  40 60 80 100 
Fraquaney 
Table 34. Table of Paygrade by Q29 (UNMUNC Humanitarian Relief). 





Col Pet 1 21      31      4|      51 Total 
FI            l       4 1     0       0 
"          0 33    1-34 I   0.00    0.00 
20!00   80.00    0.00    0.00 
0.87    3.74 i   0.00    0.00 
0       5 




































'     2       0 
0.67    0.00 
40.00    0.00 




































1   0.33 
! 100.00 












1    o     1 |   0.00    0.33 
1   0.00 





















1 XXX******************** 115 115 38.46 38.46 
2 ********************* 107 222 35.79 74.25 
3 *********** 57 279 19.06 93.31 
4 * 7 286 2.34 95.65 
5 XXX 
——+.,.-*---♦—.-+---»— 
13 299 4.55 100.00 
20  40  60 80 100 
Fraquaney 





































11 1 6 4 
3.68 1 2.01 i 1.34 
11.70 6.38 1 4.26 
47.83 1 






































































































I y +—-+-—•+ ►—-+ ►- 



























Table 35. Table of Paygrade by Q30 (UNMUNC Police Action). 





Col Pet 21 
•H  
E6 1   I 0.33   I 
20.00   I 










1      31      41 51 
1    o 
t   0.00 
i   0.00 




























0.33   I 
100.00   I 
0.70   I 
rr 
1.34   I 
80.00   I 













1      0 1 0 0 1 
0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
20.00 0.00 i 0.00 0.00 1 





0 33 1 0. 1 100 00 1 0. 














0.33   I 
100.00   I 























Total 143 111 23 12 













































-+ (■— -+ ►- -+—+- 









































28      42 
9.36   14.05 
29.79 1  44.68 
43.08 I  29.37 
11












26      54       9 
8.70   18.06    3.01 
23.42   48.65    8.11 








9 1     30 
3.01 1  10.03 
13.43 1  44.78 













11     6       2 
0.33 I   2.01 1   0.67 
11.11   66.67   22.22 
1.54 i   4.20 1   4.88 





























Fraq Fraq Parcant Parcant 
1 xxxxxx 30 30 10.03 10.03 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxx 65 95 21.74 31.77 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 143 238 47.83 79.60 
4 xxxxxxxx 41 279 13.71 93.31 
5 xxxx 20 299 6.69 100.00 
20     40    60     80  100  120  140 
Fraquaney 
Table 36. Table of Paygrade by Q31 (FTX USC UN Soldiers). 





Col  Pet 51 4| 
5 I 
1 .67 1 
100 .00 





























0.00   I 
0   I 
0.00 
0.00 





 ! 0 00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 





















0.00   I 



























1 xxxxxx 30 30 
10.03 10.03 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxx 65 95 
21.74 31.77 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 143 238 
47.83 79.60 
4 xxxxxxxx 41 279 
13.71 93.31 
5 xxxx 20 299 
6.69 100.00 
20     40    60     80  100   120  140 
Fraquancy 
















21      3|      4 51 
11     2|     0       2 1 
0.33 1   0.67 I   0.00    0.67 
20.00   40.00    0.00   40.00 
1.59 i   1.37 i   0.00   10.53 1 









6       5 
2.00    1.67 
6.32    5.26 






























11   I 
3.67   I 
16.42 








3 .33 1 33 
14 .93 5 .97 


























































36 36 12.00 12.00 
63 99 21.00 33.00 
146 245 48.67 81.67 
36 281 12.00 93.67 
19 300 6.33 100.00 
H- -+ -+-—•■■ -+- 
20     40    60    80  100  120  140 
Frequency 
Table 37. Table of Paygrade by Q32 (FTX UNM USQ. 
Continued next page. 
159 
FrequencyI 
Percent  1 
Row Pet  1 
Col Pet  i 
__..•—•»——+ «•——»—— 
E6 1 0.33 
20.00 
2.78 









































100.00   I 
2.78   I 
0   I 0.00 
0.00   I 











































































Freq Freq Percent Percent 
1 xxxxxxx 36 36 12.00 12.00 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxx 63 99 21.00 33.00 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 146 245 48.67 81.67 
4 xxxxxxx 36 281 12.00 93.67 
5 xxxx 19 300 6.33 100.00 
 + ►—+ 1-—+—+—+- 
20    40    60    80  100  120  140 
Frequency 


































E2 20 6.67 
21.05   I 


















E3 28   I 
9.33   I 
25.23   I 
































4   ! 1.33 
44.44   i 



















































1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 80 80 26.67 26.67 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 131 211 43.67 70.33 
3 xxxxxxxxxxxx 62 273 20.67 91.00 
4 XXX 14 287 4.67 95.67 
5 XXX 13 300 4.33 100.00 
20     40    60    80  100  120 
Frequency 
Table 38. Table of Paygrade by Q33 (FTX UNM UNC US Soldiers). 







21 31 41 
—+• 
Total 







1 0 0 5 
0.33 0.00 0.00 1.67 
20.00 0.00 0.00 









I       0.33 I 
I     20.00 I 








































100.00   I 
1.25   I 
1" l~T | 0.33 I 
t 100.00 I 




0   I 
0.00 
0.00 




0.00   i (. 
0 1 0 1 0 
0 00 1 0 .00 1 0 .00 
0 00 1 0 .00 1 0 .00 











0.00   I 




































80 80 26.67 26.67 
131 211 43.67 70.33 
62 273 20.67 91.00 
14 287 4.67 95.67 
13 300 4.33 100.00 
20 
_+—+—-+—-+—-+-« 
40    60    80  100  120 
Fraquancy 
Table 38, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q33 (FTX UNM UNC US Soldiers). 
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Frequency 
Pareant     I 
Row Pet 
















40.00   I 



















































1 jxx 10 10 3.33 3.33 
2 |xxxxxxxxxxxx 61 71 20.33 23.67 
3 1xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 130 201 43.33 67.00 
4 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 86 287 28.67 95.67 
5 
1 jxxx 13 300 4.33 100.00 
20  40  60  SO 100 120 
Fraquancy 
Table 39. Table of Paygrade by Q34 (UNM USQ. 

























































































0 0 0 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00            0.00            0.00 



















































20  40 60  80 100 120 
Frequency 
Cum. 






















































37      23 1     4 1     9 1 
12.33 7.67 |   1.33    3.00 1 
38.95 24.21 I   4.21 |   9.47 1 
29.37 42.59 1  44.44 1  40.91 t 
52      16       4 1     6 
17.33 i   5.33 1   1.33 1   2.00 
46.85 1  14.41 |   3.60 1   5.41 1 
41.27 1  29.63 |  44.44 |  27.27 1 
(■ -+ -+ -+ >+  
E4 
E5 
24   I 
8.00   I 
35.82   I 

























1 1 0 1 
0.33 0.00 0.33 
11.11 0.00 11.11 






























1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 89 89 29.67 29.67 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 126 215 42.00 71.67 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 54 269 18.00 89.67 
4 XX 9 278 3.00 92.67 
5 xxxx 22 300 7.33 100.00 
20     40    60    80  100  120 
Fraquancy 
Table 40. Table of Paygrade by Q35 (UNM UNC). 




Row Pet I 






















































0   1 0 0 
0.00   i 0.00 0.00 
0.00   1 0.00 0.00 





















0   1 0 1 
0.00   1 0.00 0.33 
0.00   i 0.00 
0.00   | 0.00 
03 1   1 0   1 0   1 0   1 0 
0.33   I 0.00   1 0.00   1 0.00   1 0.00 
100.00   1 0.00   1 0.00   | 0.00   1 0.00 


















































20     40     60 
Frequency 
+ 1 +- 
80  100  120 





Col  Pet ii 2 31               41               51    Total 
El                              0 
0.00   I 
0.00 
0.00  i 
4|              0                  1                  0                  5 
1.33   1       0.00           0.33           0.00           1.67 
80.00   1       0.00         20.00           0.00 
3.67           0.00         14.29           0.00   1 
E2 
r————————T— 
26   1 
8.67 
27.37   i 





22                 2               12               95 
7.33           0.67           4.00         31.67 
23.16           2.11         12.63 
56.41         28.57         50.00 
a 
44   | 
14.67   1 
39.64   I 
36.36   1 
48   1            12                  1 
16.00   1       4.00           0.33 
43.24   I     10.81           0.90 
44.04   I     30.77         14.29 
6             111 
2.00         57.00 
5.41 
25.00 
E4 38   1 12.67   1 
56.72   1 
31.40   I 
4   I 
1.33   1 
44.44   I 
3.31   1 
18   I              4 
6.00   I       1.33 
26.87   |       5.97 
16.51   1     10.26 
2                  5 
0.67           1.67 
2.99           7.46 
28.57         20.85 
67 
22.33 
E5 3 1.00 
33.33 
2.75 
0                  119 
0.00           0.33           0.33           3.00 
0.00         11.11         11.11 




















Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 






















20 40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
Table 41. Table of Paygrade by Q36 (UNM UN NCO-S &. Officers). 

















































































































































































































































































xxxxx 24 300 
8.00 100.00 
 -+—+—-+—+——+-•—+ 
20  40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquaney 





Col Pet II 31 









2   1 0                  1 1 0.67 0.00 0.33 1 
40.00 0.00 20.00 i 
2.17   I 0.00           4.35 ■+ 





























37   1 
10 .00 12 .33   i 
27 .03 33 .33   t 





5 6 111 

























2   1 3 2 1   1 1 
0.67 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.53 
22.22   1 33.33 22.22 11.11 11.11 



















































10    20     50    40 50     60    70    80     90 
Fraquaney 
Table 42. Table of Paygrade by Q37 (UN in US Fireteams). 




Row Pet     I 
Col Pet     | II 21 31 
—►- 
41 51    Total 

























I       1.27 I 
0 
0.00 
0.00   I 









0   I 0.00 
0.00   I 







0 1   1 1     o .33 0 .00  i 0 .33   1 
1     20 .00 0 .00   1 20 .00   1 
!       1 .09 0 .00   1 4 .35   i 
I 1 I I 0.33 I 
I 100.00 I 
I 1.27 I 
03 1 0.33 
100.00 
1.27 
0 0 0 
0.00 0.00 0.00  i 0. 
0.00 0.00 0.00   1 0. 
0.00            0.00           0.00   1 






































Fraq Fraq Parcant Pareant 
79 79 26.33 26.33 
95 174 31.67 58.00 
92 266 30.67 88.67 
11 277 3.67 92.33 
23 300 7.67 100.00 
10    20    30     40    50 
Fraquancy 
60 70     80     90 





Col Pet II 21 
El      1 2 1     2 1 
0.67 I   0.67 
40.00 I  40.00 1 
1.69 I   1.98 1 







22 1 4 Ä
 1 7.33 1.33 2.00 1 
23.16 j 4.21 6.32 1 












38.74   I 
42.57   I 
11 
3.67 
9.91   I 












I 35 I 
I     11.67 I 
I     52.24 I 








15   I 
5.00   I 
22.39   I 












3   I 





1   I 






























1 |xx*****x**x************* 118 118 39.33 39.33 
2 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 101 219 33.67 73.00 
3 1xxxxxxxxxx 50 269 16.67 89.67 
4 |xx 10 279 3.33 93.00 
5 
1 jxxxx 21 300 7.00 100.00 
20     40     60     80  100  120 
Fraquancy 
Table 43. Table of Paygrade by Q38 (UN CO. over US). 









1   I 
0.33 
20.00 
0.85   I 
•+ -*• 
> 1 I       0-33 
I   100.00   I 
I       0.85   I 
2 0 1 1 1 
0.67 0.00 0.33 0.33 I 
40.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 1 
1.98    0.00 I  10.00    4.76 1 
1. —+ ►- 1- 
01 I 2 I I 0.67 I 
I 40.00 I 
I 1.69 I 
02 1   I 0.33   I 
100.00   I 
0.85   I 
03 I 1 I 0.33 
I 100.00   I 





















1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 118 118 39.33 39.33 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 101 219 33.67 73.00 
3 xxxxxxxxxx 50 269 16.67 89.67 
4 XX 10 279 3.33 93.00 
5 xxxx 21 300 7.00 100.00 
20     40    60    80  100  120 
Frequency 





Col  Pet 
El 




I     40.00   I 















26 29 24 7 
8.67 9.67 8.00 2.33 
27.37 30.53 25.26 7.37 























.-+ ^   ^ 
2.00 
66.67 






0.67   I 
22.22   I 















































1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 128 128 42.67 42.67 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 74 202 24.67 67.33 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 56 258 18.67 86.00 
4 xxxx 18 276 6.00 92.00 
5 xxxxx 
20  40 60 80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
24 300 8.00 100.00 
Table 44. Table of Paygrade by Q39 (US C-IN-C given to UN). 


















. 60.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 
2.34 1.35    1.79 1   0.00 1   o.uu I 







100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.78 o.oo i o.oo  OJJO  i:^_+ 









60.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2.34 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 
_—. 
rc M m _ 
—A L_—____+_—«.—+—.——+————+————♦ 









100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 













100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
















Fraq    Freq    Percent    Percent 
1 KXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 128 128 42.67 42.67 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 74 202 24.67 67.33 
3 xxxxxxxxxxx 56 258 18.67 86.00 
4 xxxx 18 276 6.00 92.00 
5 xxxxx 24 300 8.00 1.00.00 
20     40    60    80  100  120 
Frequency 
Table 44, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q39 (US C-1IN-C given to UN). 
174 
Frequency1 
Pareant  1 
Row Pet  1 
Col Pet  1 11 21 31 41 51 
El      1 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1.00 1 0.33 1 0.33 1 0.00 | o.oo 1 
60.00 1 20.00 1 20.00 1 0.00 | 0.00 i 
4.41 1 0.97 1 1.25 1 0.00 I 0.00 1 
E2      1 15 1 30 1 33 1 1 16 1 
5.00 1 10.00 | 11.00 1 0.33 5.33 1 
15.79 1 31.58 i 34.74 1 1.05 16.84 I 
2Z.06 1 29.13 1 41.25 1 12.50 I 39.02 1 
E3      I 28 1 43 1 22 1 3 t 15 
9.33 1 14.33 I 7.33 1 1.00 5.00 i 
25.23 1 38.74 1 19.82 1 2.70 1 13.51 1 
41.18 1 41.75 I 27.50 1 37.50 1 36.59 1 
E4      1 15 1 20 i 20 3 1 9 1 
5.00 1 6.67 i 6.67 i 1.00 1 3.00 1 
22.39 1 29.85 i 29.85 1 4.48 1 13.43 1 
22.06 1 19.42 i 25.00 1 37.50 1 21.95 i 
E3      1 4 1 3 i 2 0 1 0 I 
1.33 1 1.00 1 0.67 1 0.00 I 0.00 1 
44.44 I 33.33 1 22.22 1 0.00 1 0.00 I 
1 5.88 1 2.91 i 
-f- 

































Fraq  Fraq  Pareant  Pareant 
68   68   22.67   22.67 
103 171 34.33 57.00 
80 251 26.67 83.67 
8 259 2.67 86.33 
41 300 15.67 100.00 
-+■ 
10 20 30 40  50  60 
Fraquaney 
70 80  90 100 
Table 45. Table of Paygrade by Q40 (Oath of Office Conflict). 





Col Pet 51  Total 









Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
68   68   22.67   22.67 
103 171 34.33 57.00 
80 251 26.67 83.67 
8 259 2.67 86.33 
41 300 13.67 100.00 
10  20  30 40  50  60 
Fraquancy 
70 80  90 100 




Row Pet I 















0 1 1 
0.00 0.33 I 
0.00 20.00 1 
0.00 5.26 1 
E2      1 1 
1 
12 1    24 
4.00 I   8.00 1 
12.63 1  25.26 




13 1    38 1 
4.33 1  12.67 I 
11.71 1  34.23 
32.50 I  43.18 1 
E4 12 4.00 






E5 1   I 0.33   I 

































xxxxxxxx 40 40 13.33 13.33 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 88 128 29.33 42.67 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 124 252 41.33 84.00 
xxxxxx 29 281 9.67 93.67 
xxxx 19 300 6.33 100.00 
20  40 60  80 100 120 
Frequency 
Table 46. Table of Paygrade by Q41 (Combat Effect. Lost in UNM). 




































0.00 I ►__—_—-+. 
>   1 ! I   0.33 
I 100.00 I 



























































03 1 1 
►— 
0 
1 0 .33 0 .00 1 100 .00 0 .00 

















































40 40 13.33 13.33 
88 128 29.33 42.67 
124 252 41.33 84.00 
29 281 9.67 93.67 
19 300 6.33 100.00 
20 40    60     80  100  120 
Fraquaney 






















Freq  Freq Percent Percent 





106 173 3S.33 57.67 
71 244 23.67 81.33 
17 261 5.67 87.00 
39 300 13.00 100.00 
_f___+—. 
.+—+—+—+- »-■■» ►— 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frequency 
Table 47. Table of Paygrade by Q42 (US Permanent Unit in UN). 




Row Pet I 

































0   1 
0.00   1 
0.00   1 

















67 67 22.33 22.33 
106 173 35.53 57.67 
71 244 23.67 81.33 
17 261 5.67 87.00 




20 30 60 40  50 
Fraquaney 
70 80 90 100 

















3 41 51 
1       0 1 
0.33    0.00 
20.00    0.00 




























































9.33   i 





17.43   I 
 (. ► 1 
11 2 7 
3.67 0.67 2.33 
16.42 2.99 10.45 
18.64 20.00 30.43 


















































1 ******************** 99 99 33.00 33.00 
2 ********************** 109 208 36.33 69.33 
3 ************ 59 267 19.67 89.00 
4 XX 10 277 3.33 92.33 
5 xxxxx 23 300 7.67 100.00 
—+ -+" -+ ►— 
20  40 60 80 100 
Fraquancy 
Table 48. Table of Paygrade by Q43 (US Volunteers for UN). 











1   I 
0.33 
100.00 




























































20    40    60    80  100 
Frequency 
Fraq    Fraq    Parcant    Parcant 






















Col Pet II 21 















































31.53   I 







6.31   I 
29.17   I 
■ ■■■■- t 








19   I 
6.33   I 
28.56   I 





9   I 
3.00 
13.43   I 





















































Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
60   60   20.00   20.00 
01 161 33.67 53.67 
92 253 30.67 84.33 
25 276 7.67 92.00 
24 300 8.00 100.00 
.+——+...»       t—-t II -- I '■ ■■■ t- ' - I ■  
10     20    30    40    50    60    70    80     90  100 
Fraquancy 
Table 49. Table of Paygrade by Q44 (Give it all to UN). 







































2.97   I 
1   I 













100.00   I 
1.09   I 
0   I 




















1   I 
0.33  I 
100.00   I 





0   I 






























































60 60 20.00 20.00 
101 161 33.67 53.67 
92 253 30.67 84.33 
23 276 7.67 92.00 
24 300 8.00 100.00 
-+— 
40    50    60 
Fraquaney 
70    80    90 100 




Row Pet I 






































E3      1    53 
1  17.67 i 
1  47.75 1 
I  45.30 I 
34 1    12 
11.33 1   4.00 
30.63 I  10.81 






































h -+ ►-. 
3       2       0 1 0 1 
1.00 0.67 0.00 1 0.00 1 
33.33 22.22 0.00 1 0.00 1 























Freq    Freq    Percent    Percent 
1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 117 117 39.00 39.00 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 91 208 30.33 69.33 
3 xxxxxxxxxx 52 260 17.33 86.67 
4 xxxx 19 279 6.33 93.00 
5 xxxx 
20 40 60 80 100 
21 300 7.00 100.00 
Frequency 
Table 50. Table of Paygrade by Q45 (UN Code of Conduct). 










































0 0 0 5 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
02 !    * 1 0 1 
»— "———T 
o ! 
i  0.33 0.00 1 0.00 
1 100.00 0.00 1 0.00 i 














0       0 1 o ! 
0.33 0.00 i 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 
100.00 f 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 
0.85 1 

































117 117 39.00 39.00 
91 208 30.33 69.33 
52 260 17.33 86.67 
19 279 6.33 93.00 
21 300 7.00 100.00 
■+—+- 
20     40    60     80  100 
Fraquancy 
































 1. ►- 
20     40 
_+—(.—I» -+- 
60    80  100  120 
Fraquaney 
127 127 42.33 42.35 
58 185 19.33 61.67 
56 241 18.67 80.55 
23 264 7.67 88.00 
36 500 12.00 100.00 
Table 51. Table of Paygrade by Q46 (US Military Fires on US Citizens). 





Col Pet 1 2 3 41 ► -...-----...»■■ 51 





























































02 11     0       0 0.33 1   0.00    0.00 
100.00    0.00    0.00 
0.79 1   0.00 1   0.00 
0       0 
0.00    0.00 
0.00    0.00 
























































Fraq Fraq Pareant Pareant 
127  127   42.55   42.55 
58 185 19.55 61.67 
56 241 18.67 80.53 
25 264 7.67 88.00 
56 500 12.00 100.00 
-+-•—+- ■+• 
20    40    60    80 100 120 
Fraquaney 
Table 51, Continued. Table of Paygrade by Q46 (US Military Fires on US Citizens). 
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